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Security Council

Seventy-second year

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Thursday, 27 July 2017, 10.15 a.m.
New York

President:	Mr. Liu Jieyi	(China)
Members:	Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	Mr. Llorentty Solíz
	Egypt	Mr. Aboulatta
	Ethiopia	Mr. Alemu
	France	Mr. Delattre
	Italy	Mr. Lambertini
	Japan	Mr. Bessho
	Kazakhstan	Mr. Sadykov
	Russian Federation	Mr. Safronkov
	Senegal	Mr. Seck
	Sweden	Mr. Skau
	Ukraine	Mr. Yelchenko
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Mr. Rycroft
	United States of America	Ms. Sison
	Uruguay	Mr. Bermúdez

Agenda

The situation in the Middle East

Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015) and 2332 (2016) (S/2017/623)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.15 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in the Middle East

Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015) and 2332 (2016) (S/2017/623)

The President (*spoke in Chinese*): In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to participate in this meeting.

In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite Ms. Ursula Mueller, Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, to participate in this meeting. Ms. Mueller is joining the meeting via video-teleconference from Amman.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.

I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2017/623, which contains the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015) and 2332 (2016).

I now give the floor to Ms. Mueller.

Ms. Mueller: On behalf of Mr. Stephen O'Brien, the Emergency Relief Coordinator, I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for the opportunity to brief the Council on the latest humanitarian developments in Syria. As you mentioned, I am speaking from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in Amman.

Earlier today, I had the opportunity to visit the Azraq refugee camp, the second largest in Jordan after the Zaatari camp. About 35,000 Syrian refugees are living there, with many of them having been there for several years. Most of them are women and children. About a quarter of the refugees are originally from Aleppo, and nearly 20 per cent are from Homs. My visit left me with many impressions.

First, it made clear the level of the generosity and hospitality shown by Jordan and other neighbouring host countries, whose local authorities and communities have welcomed the influx of Syrian refugees, despite the pressures it has put on their own resources. Secondly, I saw the tremendous work being done by the humanitarian organizations whose programming enables families not just to survive but to lead dignified lives in the most difficult conditions. Most of all, however, I was inspired by the incredible hope and strength of the people I met, despite the terrible circumstances that have been forced on them. Their message was clear, and I would like to pass it on to the Council today. What they want, more than anything, is for the guns to fall silent and the conflict to end, and to be able to go home when it is safe to do so.

The hope and strength in Azraq are replicated across Syria — a remarkable fact considering that daily life remains dangerous and desperate for millions of people inside the country. While we have continued to see a drop in the violence in some areas since the 4 May memorandum on de-escalation, particularly in recent weeks in Dar'a governorate, the humanitarian and protection situation remains extremely difficult for civilians in many parts of the country. In the besieged area of eastern Ghouta, in rural Damascus, and the Jobar neighbourhood in the city of Damascus, military operations have started again.

In early and mid-July, air strikes and shelling on the towns of Ein Tarma and Hazzeh reportedly killed and injured several people. A local market in the besieged town of Kafr Batna was shelled on 16 July, killing or injuring many civilians. On 19 July, mortar shelling on the Harasta hospital in a north-eastern suburb of Damascus reportedly injured one person and damaged the medical facility in another reminder that the scourge of attacks on civilian infrastructure continues unabated.

Despite the announcement on 22 July of a ceasefire for eastern Ghouta, we have received reports of air strikes on Irbin, Douma, Zamalka and Otaya towns in the past three days that have killed or injured scores of civilians. Urgent effort is needed to de-escalate the situation, and we call on the parties to ensure the protection of civilians and unimpeded humanitarian access. In Idlib, infighting among non-State armed groups and designated terrorist groups in several towns over the past week has caused civilian casualties and led to rising tensions. On 18 July, four people were killed in a car-bomb attack in Armanaz town, and many

more incidents have been reported. Some humanitarian partners have had to suspend activities as a result.

The Bab Al-Hawa crossing point on the Turkish border — a lifeline for civilians in north-western Syria — was reportedly closed owing to the fighting and insecurity on the Syrian side of the border from 19 to 25 July, although humanitarian and commercial shipments have since resumed. The situation in areas of north-western Syria held by non-State armed groups remains extremely worrying, particularly given the high level of need among approximately 1 million displaced people living in the area, including many from formally besieged areas.

Operations countering Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) continue in Raqqa governorate. Heavy fighting and air strikes continue to result in civilian casualties and injuries. For example, reports indicate that dozens of civilians were killed and injured as a result of air strikes and shelling in July. Large-scale displacement also continues to be recorded with more than 30,000 people displaced since 1 July, bringing the total to more than 200,000 since 1 April in Raqqa governorate.

Significant protection concerns remain for those displaced, particularly in terms of freedom of movement outside of the camps in which they are being hosted. Humanitarian conditions are also very difficult for those who are displaced, particularly with temperatures approaching 50°C. An estimated 20,000 to 50,000 people remain inside Raqqa city, which is now encircled, and their situation is perilous. There is no way for them to get out. Civilian movement out of the city remains extremely difficult owing to the presence of mines and other unexploded ordnance, as well as shelling, sniper activities and air strikes. As military operations continue, our concern is further civilian casualties, especially since ISIL has allegedly used civilians as human shields. The Emergency Relief Coordinator noted last month that military actors must do everything in their power to ensure that civilians caught up in the fighting are protected. The United Nations and its partners are responding to those who have been displaced, and we are ready to provide support in Raqqa city as soon as access and security conditions allow.

The health situation, particularly the low availability of trauma-care services, is a major concern in view of the intense fighting and shifting front lines. We continue to engage with relevant parties and actors on the ground to ensure that medical care be made available to those who need it, but a lot more needs to be done.

The situation at the berm on the Syrian-Jordanian border has also taken a worrying turn for the more than 50,000 Syrian civilians stranded there. On 18 July, the explosion of an improvised explosive device in Al-Rukban camp reportedly killed three children and injured five others. Reports indicate that the Syrian army is now surrounding the area on the Syrian side following field battles between it and non-State armed groups. Given the desperate security and humanitarian situation, it is crucial that humanitarian programming to the area be regular and uninterrupted. We are also working hard with partners to identify a solution for the people stranded in the berm area.

Let me now turn to the latest news concerning humanitarian access to besieged and hard-to-reach areas. Unfortunately, there is little positive news to report. There have been no convoys to besieged areas in July, although airdrops to Deir ez-Zor have continued. In terms of convoys to hard-to-reach areas, we have been down to one convoy per week for the month of July, while reaching more than 120,000 people in Yalda, Babila, Beit Sahem in rural Damascus, Al-Houle, Harbanifseh and Dar Kabira. Meanwhile, other humanitarian partners also delivered convoys from Damascus to hard-to-reach areas in July. That means that, under the United Nations June-July plan, we have thus far reached only more than a third of the 1 million people who were targeted.

The obstacles to convoys proceeding as planned are predictable, including the lack of approvals, facilitation letters from the Government of Syria and other administrative delays, as well as insecurity and fighting. At the same time, arbitrary restrictions imposed by some non-State armed groups, listed terrorist groups and self-designated local authorities also continue to obstruct access in various ways, especially in Idlib and the Eastern governorate of Syria. That means that, despite reductions in violence, we have not been able to noticeably increase our reach.

Despite the security and access challenges in reaching besieged and hard-to-reach areas, as well as the high threat posed to humanitarian workers, the United Nations and its partners continue to implement one of the largest humanitarian operations in the world

in Syria. Humanitarians continue to reach millions of people on a monthly basis. The latest and only available data as of May shows that humanitarians collectively reached 8.5 million people in a single month, including 4.4 million women and girls and 4.1 million men and boys with multisectoral assistance.

Of particular note is the beginning of the polio vaccination campaign this week by the World Health Organization, UNICEF and other health partners, which is targeting 450,000 children in Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa. Thus far, 27 polio cases have been confirmed. I call on all parties to ensure the safety of and access for the vaccination campaign teams. As members are aware, the polio virus respects no borders or any political, religious or security affiliations, and we must contain it.

This month marks the third anniversary of the adoption of resolution 2165 (2014). Since then, the modality has been a success with United Nations cross-border deliveries providing a lifeline for millions of people in nine governorates. With more than 15,000 trucks monitored and confirmed by the United Nations Monitoring Mechanism during this period for the integrity of their consignments without incident, the importance of United Nations cross-border operations is surely beyond question. As it remains a vital lifeline to so many need, that modality to deliver aid must be preserved during the coming months.

The conflict in Syria may be complex, but ensuring that people are protected and supported is our imperative as humanitarians and human beings. None of us should stand silent while civilians suffer and while fear tactics and the denial of food water, medical supplies, and other forms of aid are used as methods of war. What we and the Syrian people look to the Security Council and to the international community for today is that all parties uphold their basic obligations under international humanitarian law and human rights law; that civilians are protected; that attacks on civilian infrastructure be stopped; that regular and unhindered access to all modalities, including medical supplies, be allowed; and that the horrific practice of siege end.

The President (*spoke in Chinese*): I thank Ms. Mueller for her briefing.

I shall now give the floor to those Council members who wish to make statements.

Mr. Bermúdez (Uruguay) (*spoke in Spanish*): We thank the Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator in the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Ms. Ursula Mueller, for her comprehensive briefing. We reiterate our gratitude to her and her entire team for their ongoing efforts in Syria. They are always ready and willing to provide assistance, regardless of the difficult conditions on the ground.

Regrettably, despite those efforts, aid distribution has become increasingly sporadic, thereby preventing the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs from being able to carry out the duties entrusted to it. The ongoing fighting, security issues or — even more incomprehensibly — the lack of authorization by and the bureaucracy imposed by the Syrian Government all prevent humanitarian assistance from being provided to those who need it most. As we have noted on previous occasions, that is in no way the fault of OCHA but rather of the Security Council and the member States with influence over the parties to the conflict. To date, we have not been able to wield that influence effectively to ensure that all parties to the Syrian conflict grant unimpeded access to the humanitarian aid convoys.

For Uruguay, the protection of civilians in Syria, Yemen and in any other conflict is our top priority. Thus far, all conflicting parties in Syria have continued to ignore and violate that basic principle of international law. As often occurs in all such conflicts, the most vulnerable — including women, children and the elderly — have been and continue to be those most affected. That is why Uruguay has endorsed the establishment of an international impartial and independent mechanism to investigate serious violations of human rights law and international humanitarian law committed in Syria, including those that are considered to be war crimes, such as the use of chemical weapons on civilians.

Seeking justice for the hundreds of thousands of innocent victims of the conflict will be crucial to achieving lasting peace in Syria and to ensuring that the country and its entire population can overcome the horrors of this protracted war. It will also have a compelling effect on the future of the country. In the same vein, we support the request of Secretary-General António Guterres that events occurring in Syria be referred to the International Criminal Court.

For several months now, the priorities in Syria have been clearly defined. The Council is duty-bound to produce results in order to give hope to the Syrian people that the war is ending; those who have committed atrocities since 2011 will be held accountable and that a new kind of political climate will emerge in order to rectify the effects of many years of divisions and clashes that have left a trail of death and destruction for the country and its people. Until it has been achieved, the primary goal is and should continue to be a political solution that would put an end to the crisis and lead to a peaceful transition in Syria, negotiated by all Syrians, mediated by the United Nations and supported by the entire international community. We trust in the good offices of Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura in his efforts to translate into concrete steps the road map outlined in resolution 2254 (2015) in order to achieve that goal.

The second goal must be to reduce the levels of violence and allow for the cessation of hostilities throughout the majority of the country. The Astana process, which is playing a very positive role, complements the intra-Syrian talks in Geneva and has already achieved considerable progress. We are also pleased that the United States, Russia and Jordan have been able to broker an agreement on a ceasefire in south-western Syria, which has seen a spike in violence over the past few months. We support the efforts of the three guarantor countries and encourage them to continue working to finalize the details of the implementation of the ceasefire in the four safe zones and in other parts of the country that may be added subsequently.

Nonetheless, for the third consecutive month, we must voice our concern about the continued lack of information on the implementation of the memorandum signed on 4 May, in particular given the fact that, to date, neither the United Nations nor humanitarian aid has been granted unhindered access to those areas. That, however, would give some assurance that the essential principles of international humanitarian law are being respected, such as humanitarian access, the prohibition of forced displacement, and freedom of movement so that people can freely enter and leave those areas.

The third goal, which is as equally important as the political transition process and the cessation of hostilities, is clearly humanitarian access. We would like to receive more encouraging news but it is clear that we remain far from any promising outcome that would ease the suffering of the millions of Syrian civilians who depend on that aid to survive each day. We will continue therefore to call for the immediate, sustained and unhindered access of humanitarian aid to all besieged and hard-to-reach areas. Nonetheless, the top priority must be to lift all unjustifiable sieges.

We must mention that is has been over a year since the adoption of resolution 2286 (2016), and yet attacks on hospitals and health centres in Syria continue. In June alone, four incidents at such centres were reported. It is shocking that the parties continue to ignore the provisions of resolution 2286 (2016), thereby depriving millions of people of their right to medical attention, leaving hundreds of victims among medical and health-care personnel. Such acts constitute serious violations of international humanitarian law and war crimes. Clashes and indiscriminate attacks continue to cause damage to civilian infrastructure, which is on the brink of collapse after years of bombing. We condemn such attacks in Syria, Yemen and wherever they occur.

In conclusion, Uruguay asserts that the full and effective implementation of measures such as the consolidation of the cessation of hostilities, the protection of civilians and civilian infrastructure and administrative procedures that allow for humanitarian access to be granted could all make a major difference in the lives of the Syrian people, who, month after month, demand that the Council take concrete and effective action on the ground.

With regard to the de-escalation zones that would allow for the temporary cessation of attacks, Uruguay maintains that it is very important for those zones to be temporary so as to preserve the unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic. As we have previously mentioned, it is therefore imperative, as soon as possible, to honour commitments that place emphasis on the humanitarian situation. We trust that the Security Council can overcome its differences and shoulder its responsibilities in the area of international peace and security.

Mr. Llorentty Soliz (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (*spoke in Spanish*): Bolivia thanks Ms. Ursula Mueller, Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator in the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, for her briefing. We again reiterate our firm support as she conducts her duties.

Bolivia would like to highlight the efforts made by Russia, Iran and Turkey as the guarantor countries

of the ceasefire in Syria. We also highlight the Astana meeting held on 4 May as a step forward, through the establishment of four de-escalation zones to prevent further incidents, put an immediate end to armed clashes and allow for improved and unconditional provision of humanitarian aid. We call for the Astana agreement and resolution 2336 (2016) of 30 December 2016 to be fully implemented, as long as dangerous and hard-to reach areas exist.

According to the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 13.5 million people already have been forced to leave their homes in search of security. Many of them are minors and therefore are in need of urgent humanitarian assistance. According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Committee of the Red Cross, 6.6 million people have been displaced internally, 4.6 million live in areas that are difficult to access and are constantly being attacked, not to mention that after six years of ongoing violence approximately 5 million people have had to take refuge in neighbouring countries. To date, more than half of the population has been forced to leave their homes. We emphasize, as Ms. Mueller did, our thanks to the countries that are hosting refugees.

Despite the ceasefire agreements, ongoing attacks have resulted in the deaths of a considerable number of civilians, and women and children are always the most affected. We are alarmed that these attacks are also being directed at civilian infrastructure, such as homes, schools and hospitals where lives can be saved. Bolivia, a peace-loving country, insists that the ceasefire agreements must be implemented and respected. We reiterate, at the same time, the obligation that all parties that are involved have to guarantee the security and integrity of those who are trapped in the conflict. In this regard, we once again remind the parties involved in the conflict that they must provide unconditional access for humanitarian assistance and guarantee and protect the security and integrity of that assistance and not identify the humanitarian assistance convoys as military targets. We also call for the intensification of efforts to ensure access to areas that are besieged and hard to access in line with international humanitarian law.

As long as military tactics are given priority over politics, there can be no lasting peace and civilians, in particular women and children, will continue to be exposed to violence, the lack of humanitarian access and the lack of basic services. We reiterate our most heartfelt thanks to the work being done by the staff at the various humanitarian agencies, whose personnel are putting their own lives on the line to provide food and nutrition and medical supplies as well as assistance to alleviate the crisis undergone by the Syrian people. We call on the parties to the conflict to respect international humanitarian law and the risky work being carried out by the staff on the ground.

We commend the work being carried out by the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic both to ensure security in the deployment of humanitarian assistance and in evacuating people from areas where armed clashes have broken out.

We express, once again, our vigorous condemnation of all terrorism. It is criminal and unjustifiable regardless of the reason for it or where or when or by whom it is carried out. We reaffirm that all States must fight this scourge using all peaceful means at our disposal and the Charter of the United Nations and other international instruments.

In that regard, we condemn the terrorist attacks against the Russian Embassy in Damascus on 24 and 25 June. The Plurinational State of Bolivia firmly believes that the creation of more de-escalation zones should continue to be pursued so that humanitarian assistance for the civilian population can be extended. In this regard, we welcome the ceasefire in the south-west of Syria, agreed on the 7 July, between Russia, the United States and Jordan, as well as the work carried out in Cairo and Moscow forums.

Finally, the only way to resolve this conflict is through an inclusive and orderly political process that is led by and for the Syrian people. We therefore reaffirm our support for the advances made at the Astana and Geneva meetings. We have high hopes that this dialogue will lead to a lasting peace.

The President (*spoke in Chinese*): I give the floor to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic.

Mr. Ja'afari (Syrian Arab Republic) (*spoke in Arabic*): The Government of my country has read the forty-first monthly report of the Secretary-General (S/2017/623). We note that certain parts of the report are somewhat different from previous reports. Nonetheless, we regret that, yet again, the authors of the report have overlooked the real reasons for the deterioration

of the living conditions of Syrian citizens. The report also ignores the real obstacles that are preventing humanitarian assistance from reaching those who need it. Foremost among them are the following.

First is the extremely critical security situation as a result of the terrorism of Da'esh, the Al-Nusra Front and associated groups, entities and individuals. In addition, there has been infighting among these armed terrorist groups for a while now. They are the ones who are impeding humanitarian convoys access, mining the roads used by convoys or failing to agree to monitor crossing points.

Secondly, coercive unilateral economic measures are being imposed by the United States, the European Union and other States. These measures affect first and foremost the Syrian people and, as a result, have seriously impacted humanitarian conditions in Syria, including basic services, such as health care, water, electricity and education. The logistical difficulties are enormous and prevent us from implementing the humanitarian plans. For example, the Syrian Arab Red Crescent has very few trucks and lacks fuel, not to mention the air strikes carried out by the United States targeting power stations, water stations and other infrastructure.

Thirdly, the Governments of donor countries have reneged on the pledges about which they brag at international conferences from which the Syrian Government is completely excluded, even though it is the primary party concerned. This is why current humanitarian financing is only 21 per cent of what is needed. This is a major obstacle, yet it is completely ignored by the authors of the report.

Fourthly, certain regional and international parties are continuously intervening in Syrian affairs in a negative way, with a view to achieving their destructive agendas, prolonging the Syrian crisis and obstructing efforts aimed at reaching a peaceful political resolution through a Syrian-led political process, without foreign intervention, which the United Nations has repeatedly endorsed. I know whereof I speak. As representatives are aware, I was away for three months during which time I was deeply involved in the Astana and Geneva processes. I know very well who was impeding the agreements in Astana and Geneva.

Today we are meeting to discuss the forty-first report. We have been engaging in this monthly exercise for three and a half years now. We continue to read reports that are clearly lacking in expertise and professionalism. We have also listened to malicious briefings, once from Amman and others from Beirut and Geneva, yet we have not heard no briefing from the United Nations representatives in Damascus. These reports contradict the noble humanitarian objectives that are supposed to be achieved through a process that can succeed only with cooperation, coordination and humanitarian partnership that are free from any political consideration, between the Syrian Government, on the one hand, and the United Nations, on the other.

I would like to refer to what Ms. Mueller said a while ago from Amman. In all her briefings, she has never mentioned the least form of cooperation with the Syrian Government. Not once has she mentioned any cooperation whatsoever with the Syrian Government. She mentioned aid that she had provided to 8 million people. In other words, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) had helped 8 million people, but where did this happen? Did it happen on Mars or perhaps on Jupiter? She noted that she had provided humanitarian aid that reached millions of different people. Perhaps on the planet Venus, where there is no Government. She did not say that she had carried out these positive activities in cooperation with the Syrian Government. OCHA would not have been able to do that without the cooperation of the Syrian Government. However, she did not mention a word about any cooperation of the Syrian Government with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and other United Nations agencies.

This what we mean when we say there has been lack of professionalism and maturity with regard to the United Nations reports on the humanitarian situation in Syria. We want a humanitarian partnership between our Government and the Office. OCHA cannot replace the Syrian Government. We will not allow that to happen . Ms. Mueller also said: "[W]e and the Syrian people look to the Security Council [to ensure] that civilians are protected". Who gave Ms. Mueller the right to speak on behalf of the Syrian people? How could she overstep her mandate and say that she and the Syrian people ask the Security Council to provide protection for civlians? How dare she say that before the Security Council?

I am sure that, regrettably, the monthly reports have deliberately been diverted from their objective. These reports are misused. Instead of trying to help us to overcome the difficulties that prevent humanitarian aid from reaching those who need it, these reports are

used to slander the Syrian Government and to apply pressure to the Syrian Government and its allies in the fight against terrorism. They are just a cover to channel humanitarian aid convoys to armed terrorist groups instead of reaching the Syrian people who need them, with a view to prolonging the crisis and boosting the morale of terrorists who use civilians as human shields.

Ms. Mueller cast doubt even on the fact that terrorists are using civilians as human shields, when she said that terrorists had allegedly used civilians as human shields". "Allegedly". Can she really say these are allegations after all these scandals in Mosul, Aleppo, Homs, Palmyra and Raqqa. Ms. Mueller is still unconvinced that Da'esh used civilians as human shields. She has allegations. She received allegations.

The Syrian Government spares no effort to assume its responsibilities to improve the living conditions of Syrian citizens without discrimination. However, United Nations officials with mandates in the humanitarian process, particularly in OCHA, have persistently refused to enter into a genuine humanitarian partnership with the Syrian Government. They have opted for the logic of anonymity, for demolishing the bridges of mutual cooperation and trust and for questioning its credibility as a humanitarian partner whose cooperation is inescapable in order to implement the humanitarian response plans.

In that regard, with the permission of the Under-Secretary-General and Ms. Mueller, I would like to present documented information for the official record. We as a Government take responsibility for this information, to the effect that there are officials of international and United Nations agencies working on the ground in Syria who prefer to distance themselves from the contents of the monthly reports of the Secretary-General with respect to the activities of their agencies in Syria. Those agencies have confirmed to us that they had not provided the reported information to OCHA. Those agencies have even rejected the inclusion of this information in the monthly reports in such a negative and fragmented way because it does not reflect the true nature of the coordination and effective cooperation with the Syrian Government on the delivery of humanitarian assistance. That is what we hear from United Nations representatives in Damascus.

Moreover, those international and United Nations officials have affirmed that some OCHA officials encourage those agencies to not cooperate with the Syrian Government. OCHA seems to be saying that it does not need the Syrian Government in order to carry out its humanitarian work, as if the Office were working on another planet or doing its humanitarian assistance work on Mars. It goes without saying that this contradicts the obligations of OCHA towards the Syrian Government under Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014) and 2191 (2014). In that regard, my Government draws the attention of the authors of the report to the fact that the criticism of national reconciliation sends a message of support to terrorists and their financiers because this reconciliation is intended to end the suffering of millions of people who have been used as human shields by terrorists for several years now.

The national character of such reconciliation is based on the following. We offer the opportunity to all armed persons to regularize their situation, surrender their weapons and either remain with their families in their homes or to leave the area included in the reconciliation agreement and relocate elsewhere. We have made this offer without the slightest pressure on the civilians living in those areas. That has allowed a number of families to return to their homes and to live normal lives. Does that cause concern to the authors of the report? Is it not something that they should instead encourage and even be positively involved in?

With respect to criticizing the reconciliation, the authors of the report had no qualms about rejecting any direct accusation of the aircraft of the so-called international coalition led by the United States. The coalition uses incendiary weapons, causing the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians, as well as the destruction of infrastructure, including dams, bridges, hospitals, schools, development institutions of the Syrian people and the economic resources which it needs for reconstruction. I note in particular wells, and gas and oil infrastructure.

I would also like to mention the massacres of civilians in the cities of Mayadin and Al-Bukamal in May. I would also mention attacks in the villages of Sur and Dablan, the region of Mayadin, the village of Ziban on the outskirts of Deir ez-Zor in late June, Tal al-Shayer on 19 June, Zayanat village on 4 July, and the village of Kishkish, in southern rural Hasakah province, on 12 July. Those are just a few examples.

I should like to put a question to the authors of this report and to all of United Nations officials on

Syrian soil. Are not these losses in human life, which run into the thousands, as well as the losses to Syrian infrastructure, which have cost us billions of dollars, the result of the barbaric bombings of the so-called international coalition and a cause of the suffering of the Syrian people? Should not those figures be included in detail in the monthly reports? Should not the United Nations take the initiative to pay compensation to Syrian civilians who have lost their homes, their farms, their factories and their schools, which the children who have been killed can no longer attend? Who will pay the cost of all the losses inflicted by this international coalition on Syrian power and water stations, dams, bridges and oil and gas facilities?

The Government of Syria would like to ensure that the realities concerning the implementation of the distribution plan for humanitarian aid are clearly understood, especially for some of the more unstable regions. To that end, my Government has sent many messages to the Secretary-General, the Security Council and the United Nations Office in Geneva, presenting statistics and precise figures on the humanitarian convoys, with the help of our national humanitarian partners. However, the authors of the report and the representatives of OCHA continue to tamper with those numbers under an agenda that seeks to pressure my Government and in fact blackmail it. We want to know how it is that the authors of the report speak of only two humanitarian convoys since the beginning of this year, when the facts and figures clearly show that 48 such convoys have been able to reach their destinations since the beginning of 2017. That is an enormous difference. The report says that two convoys have reached areas that are very hard to reach, to the benefit of 412,580 families. We say that there were 48 such convoys. I repeat, 48 humanitarian convoys, not two as stated in the report.

The report also mentions 11 besieged areas. The Government of my country reaffirms that terrorist groups are responsible for the siege of these towns. Those groups are besieging these towns inside and out, preventing access to them, using civilians in those areas as human shields, and denying civilians access to food, medical and humanitarian aid. In fact, they are selling those items to civilians at exorbitant prices, which many cannot afford.

What happened in eastern Aleppo is still fresh in our minds. We all remember that after the city was liberated, thousands of tons of food and medical supplies were discovered to have been stored in areas controlled by terrorist groups in eastern Aleppo. That scenario is happening again today in other areas, especially in eastern Ghouta, outside Damascus. In spite of all that, the authors of the report, shockingly, have apparently seen none of what has been happening in these areas, except what is negative and questionable, while turning a blind eye to what is real and positive.

There have also been accusations that the Syrian Government has been confiscating medical equipment. In this regard, the Government of my country stresses that the items that have been confiscated are either used for complex surgeries sent to areas where there are no hospitals and no specialized medical personnel to perform such surgeries, or that the number of civilians in those areas and the amounts of medical equipment sent to them are sometimes disproportionate. I note in this regard that the Syrian Government has sometimes responded to calls to evacuate the injured from regions considered by the United Nations to be besieged or hard to reach, removing them to Government hospitals where the medical infrastructure is better and they can receive the care they need.

On the other hand, the staff of OCHA have procrastinated and delayed implementing the procedures they need to take in order to dispatch the humanitarian convoys. They have even refused to send these convoys to many areas that deserve aid and need help. They have focused on areas where armed terrorist groups are located and abandoned the regions where those groups are absent. For instance, the Fu'ah and Kafraya areas have both been under siege by the Al-Nusra Front and other terrorist groups for the past three and a half years. Despite that, the United Nations has stopped sending humanitarian convoys to either town — and I am talking about 7,000 Syrian citizens who are in need of that aid. That has been the case ever since the so-called Four Towns Agreement came to an end several months ago. I would therefore like to ask the Security Council, which is convened today to discuss the humanitarian situation in my country, Syria, to take every measure necessary to end the suffering of those two villages, which are under siege by armed terrorist groups seeking to commit genocide by shelling, sniping and starvation, similar to what we saw in the 15 April bombing of Rashidin, in which, Council members will recall, more than 120 women and children were killed.

In conclusion, I must emphasize that the noble goal of the humanitarian operation in Syria is to save the lives

of millions of Syrians suffering from the effects of the crisis and the terrorist war that has been waged on my country for the past seven years. Its success therefore depends on establishing a genuine humanitarian partnership and measures that engender mutual trust and transparency between the Syrian Government and the United Nations. I hope that when the next report is published, the Security Council will be able to hear from representatives of United Nations agencies who are actually on Syrian territory.

The President (*spoke in Chinese*): The representative of the United States has asked for the floor to make a statement.

Ms. Sison (United States of America): In response to the last speaker's statement, I would like to take this opportunity to thank Assistant Secretary-General Mueller and the dedicated and brave teams of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the United Nations agencies. They and their implementing partners on the ground are saving lives and helping the Syrian people every day, while the Syrian Government continues to terrorize its people and cause unimaginable suffering. OCHA has our support.

The President (*spoke in Chinese*): There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers.

As this is the last scheduled meeting of the Security Council for the month of July, before adjourning the meeting I would like to express the delegation of China's sincere appreciation to the members of the Council, especially my colleagues the Permanent Representatives and their staffs, and to the secretariat of the Council, for all the support they have given us.

It has indeed been a busy month, and one in which we rallied to achieve consensus on several important issues within our purview. We could not have done it alone or without the hard work, support and positive contributions of every delegation and the representatives of the secretariat, as well as all the relevant conference service officers, interpreters and translators. As we end our presidency, I know I speak on behalf of the Council in wishing the delegation of Egypt good luck for the month of August.

I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject.

The meeting rose at 11.10 a.m.

United Nations S/PV.8016

Security Council

Seventy-second year

Provisional

8016th meeting
Wednesday, 2 August 2017, 10 a.m.
New York

President:	Mr. Aboulatta	(Egypt)
Members:	Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	Mr. Llorentty Soliz
	China	Mr. Zhang Dianbin
	Ethiopia	Mr. Alemu
	France	Mr. Melki
	Italy	Mr. Lambertini
	Japan	Mr. Kawamura
	Kazakhstan	Mr. Sadykov
	Russian Federation	Mr. Nebenzia
	Senegal	Mr. Seck
	Sweden	Mr. Skau
	Ukraine	Mr. Lisuchenko
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Mr. Rycroft
	United States of America	Ms. Sison
	Uruguay	Mr. Bermúdez

Agenda

The situation in Burundi

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections* should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org).

17-24077 (E)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m.

Expression of thanks to the outgoing President

The President (*spoke in Arabic*): As this is the first public meeting of the Security Council for the month of August, I should like to take this opportunity, on behalf of the Security Council, to pay tribute to His Excellency Ambassador Liu Jieyi, Permanent Representative of China, for his service as President of the Council for the month of July. I am sure I speak for all members of the Security Council in expressing deep appreciation to Ambassador Liu and his delegation for the great diplomatic skill with which they conducted the Council's business last month.

Expression of welcome to the new Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation

The President (*spoke in Arabic*): I should also like to extend, on behalf of the Council, a warm welcome to the new Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, His Excellency Mr. Vassily Alekseevich Nebenzia. We look forward to collaborating closely with him and we wish him every success.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Burundi

The President (*spoke in Arabic*): The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.

The Council has before it the text of a statement by the President on behalf of the Council on the subject of today's meeting. I thank Council members for their valuable contributions to the statement.

In accordance with the understanding reached among the members of the Council, I shall take it that the members of the Security Council agree to the statement, which will be issued as a document of the Security Council under the symbol S/PRST/2017/13.

The meeting rose at 10.10 a.m.

United Nations S/PV.8017

Security Council

Seventy-second year

Provisional

8017th meeting
Wednesday, 2 August 2017, 10.10 a.m.
New York

President:	Mr. Aboulatta	(Egypt)
Members:	Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	Mr. Llorentty Soliz
	China	Mr. Liu Jieyi
	Ethiopia	Mr. Alemu
	France	Mr. Delattre
	Italy	Mr. Lambertini
	Japan	Mr. Kawamura
	Kazakhstan	Mr. Sadykov
	Russian Federation	Mr. Nebenzia
	Senegal	Mr. Seck
	Sweden	Mr. Skau
	Ukraine	Mr. Lisuchenko
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Mr. Rycroft
	United States of America	Mrs. Haley
	Uruguay	Mr. Rosselli

Agenda

Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts

Preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons

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17-24083 (E)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts

Preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons

The President (*spoke in Arabic*): In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the following briefers to participate in this meeting: Mr. Yury Fedotov, Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; Mr. Jehangir Khan, Officer in Charge of the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism; Mr. Weixiong Chen, Deputy Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate; and Mr. Emmanuel Roux, Special Representative of INTERPOL to the United Nations.

Mr. Fedotov is joining us via video-teleconference from Vienna.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.

Members of the Council have before them document S/2017/659, which contains the text of a draft resolution submitted by Egypt.

I now give the floor to Mr. Fedotov.

Mr. Fedotov: Allow me to begin by commending the presidency of Egypt for holding a meeting on this very important and timely topic.

As the Security Council has recognized on several occasions, preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons, including conventional arms as well as weapons of mass destruction, is essential to countering terrorism. Terrorists obtain weapons by many means, in all parts of the world, facilitated by access to poorly secured stockpiles; weak border management; the use of online platforms, including hidden marketplaces; and diversion linked to poor transfer controls. Illicit weapons trafficking is often associated with other forms of organized crime.

Furthermore, the Security Council has highlighted the growing threat to international peace and security posed by the nexus of organized crime and terrorism, with terrorist groups benefiting from crime and from links with organized criminal networks. Preventing weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists thus presents complex challenges requiring integrated, multifaceted criminal-justice responses.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is entrusted with promoting the implementation of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, including its Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition. UNODC also supports the implementation of the international instruments against terrorism, the conventions on corruption and drugs, and United Nations standards and norms on crime prevention and criminal justice.

Seven of the nineteen international legal instruments related to counter-terrorism address the criminalization of conducts by non-State actors regarding chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, as well as nuclear and other radioactive material. UNODC also works closely with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and its Group of Experts to prevent the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors.

We support the implementation of the Firearms Protocol to prevent and combat the illicit manufacturing and diversion of and trafficking in firearms and ammunition, and to enhance States' capacities to go after criminal organizations engaged in the illicit firearms business and related forms of transnational organized crime. This includes enhancing national policies and legislation as well as firearms management and collection and destruction activities; technical assistance tools and capacity-building; and promoting and facilitating international cooperation and information exchange.

Through our Global Firearms Programme, UNODC is working in key parts of the world, including the Maghreb and the Sahel as well as the Western Balkans, to strengthen the fight against illicit trafficking in firearms and its links to terrorism. The Office also took part in a briefing of the Counter-Terrorism Committee on this topic in May, and we are in discussions with the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate to explore synergies for joint action.

However, many challenges remain in preventing, detecting, investigating and successfully prosecuting illicit trafficking in weapons, including inadequate

regulatory environments and data collection; lack of specialized skills and equipment; and lack of coordination within and among countries and regions.

Looking ahead, we need to further strengthen cross-border partnerships and operational responses, promote the involvement of diverse stakeholders, including the private sector, and step up tailored assistance to address gaps in capacity.

UNODC remains fully engaged in providing comprehensive support through our integrated country, regional and global programmes and network of field offices, in coordination with our United Nations partners and other partners, including INTERPOL. Our Global Container Control Programme with the World Customs Organization in particular is helping to detect and stop illicit trade within the global supply chain at sea and air ports.

We are supporting Governments in their efforts to curb corruption and money-laundering as well as combat cybercrime and the exploitation of the Internet for terrorist purposes, all of which represent critical elements of an integrated response aimed at preventing and disrupting terrorism and organized crime.

We look forward to working closely with the new Office for Counter-Terrorism, recently established by the Secretary-General, to ensure that our work is as efficient and effective as possible and better coordinated through the United Nations system.

UNODC welcomes the draft resolution to be adopted today by the Council (S/2017/659) and will take it as important guidance to further advance our efforts to respond to this threat.

The President (*spoke in Arabic*): I thank Mr. Fedotov for his briefing.

I now give the floor to Mr. Khan.

Mr. Khan: I would like to begin by thanking you, Mr. President, for having organized today's meeting. I would also like to express my gratitude for the excellent leadership shown by the Arab Republic of Egypt of the Counter-Terrorism Committee. I am sincerely grateful also to Assistant Secretary-General Jean-Paul Laborde, who has just left the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), for his very effective stewardship of CTED, with which the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism enjoys an excellent relationship. We look forward to working closely with his successor.

As this marks the first occasion on which the Office is briefing the Security Council since it was established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 71/291, allow me to thank all 15 members of the Council for their strong support for this very first United Nations reform initiative instituted by the Secretary-General. As the Council is aware, the Secretary-General has appointed a highly experienced and very distinguished diplomat, His Excellency Ambassador Vladimir Voronkov, as the Under-Secretary-General-designate of the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism, and we look forward to working under his leadership. Two weeks ago Under-Secretary-General Voronkov met with the President of the Security Council and agreed to work closely on countering terrorism.

In proposing the establishment of the Office, the Secretary-General expects that we should strengthen our coordination efforts, in particular by promoting the "All-of-UN" approach to countering terrorism. The Security Council-mandated bodies, specifically the CTED; the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team concerning the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant/Al-Qaida; and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) Expert Group will need to play a key role if we are to be successful in supporting Member States in implementing the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in a balanced manner.

The spectre of terrorists acquiring lethal technologies and new weapons, including weapons of mass destruction, poses a serious threat to international peace and security. For that reason, we welcome the consideration of today's draft resolution (S/2017/659) on preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons, and we wish to congratulate the President for putting forward that initiative. It goes to the heart of the Secretary-General's efforts to make prevention the core mission of the United Nations.

If we are to survey the threat, according to recent assessments made by Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) entities, the Office for Disarmament Affairs (ODA) and the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team concerning the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant/Al-Qaida, the illicit manufacture and uncontrolled flow of arms, including their parts and ammunition, contribute

significantly to terrorism and armed violence. The diversion of weapons from Government stockpiles, either through theft, pilferage or capture of depots, constitutes an important source of supply of weapons to terrorist groups and other non-State actors.

In addition, terrorist organizations and foreign terrorist fighters rely on legal and illegal supply chains to procure parts, including for improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The illicit online trade in weapons through the use of the dark Web on the internet is particularly worrisome. Over the years, terrorists have also improved their capabilities to design and manufacture IEDs out of commercially available dual-use components. Our focus, therefore, must not only be on preventing the illicit trade in arms, but also on ensuring that terrorist organizations cannot acquire essential components through legal or illegal commercial channels.

While the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has experienced challenges in acquiring high-quality equipment for weaponry because of sustained military pressure and shrinking income sources, they maintain some in-house ability to manufacture rocket launchers and IEDs on a very large scale. ISIL is also using commercially available drones in a variety of ways, from filming propaganda videos to observing targets to drop small-scale ammunitions.

In terms of the United Nations response, a number of United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force entities — including, as we have just heard from Under-Secretary-General Yury Fedotov, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the Counter-Terrosirm Executive Directorate, ODA and INTERPOL, all of which are members of CTITF — are implementing valuable programmes to address that threat. As we also heard from Under-Secretary-General Fedotov, UNODC is working to address illicit arms trafficking, the association between terrorism and different forms of organized crime and the need to strengthen cross-border cooperation, and soon my colleague from INTERPOL and CTED will address members of the Council in regard to that same issue.

Other United Nations entities are also working in that field. For example, in the Central African Republic, Cote d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali and Somalia the United Nations Mine Action Service works in partnership with national authorities to provide training and equipment to mark, register and store weapons; build or refurbish armouries; and help clear and destroy explosive remnants of war, including IEDs. That prevents the potential recovery and reuse of those weapons by terrorists groups. The two constituent bodies of the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism — the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force Office and the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre — also help address that threat through the 12 inter-agency working groups and targeted capacity-building support of CTITF.

I would like to mention three specific areas through which the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorim is making a contribution.

First, effective border control, especially of large, unmonitored spaces, is critical to preventing the flow of arms to terrorist groups. To help law enforcement and border control agencies prioritize, institute and implement effective measures, the CTITF Working Group on Border Management and Law Enforcement related to Counter-Terrorism spearheads a number of capacity-building projects, including the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre's Border Security Initiative, which was implemented with the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum.

That project, which developed a number of best practices, will contribute in its next phase to stronger border controls through capacity-building exercises aimed at reducing the risk of arms trafficking across borders in the Sahel region and the Horn of Africa. The United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism has also launched its Integrated Assistance for Counter-Terrorism (I-ACT) initiative in key regions and countries where the flow of arms represents a key challenge. The I-ACT for the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel), as mandated by Security Council presidential statement S/PRST/2015/24, and the Mali and Nigeria I-ACTS are based on a mapping of capacity-building needs and, subsequently, the delivery of tailored capacity-building assistance against the four pillars of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. In the case of the I-ACT for the G5 Sahel, which includes Mali, border management and the prevention of trafficking of arms will be a key component.

Secondly, in the context of addressing the foreign terrorist fighters threat, United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre and the Office of Disarmament Affairs are implementing a project, co-funded by Switzerland, which is aimed at helping States in the

Lake Chad basin region address the illicit proliferation and diversion of small arms, light weapons and ammunition to non-State armed groups, including terrorist groups. Additional trainings through the Office for Disarmament Affairs would help national authorities develop capacities to identify and interdict arms flows to foreign terrorist fighters.

The United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre-ODA project that I just mentioned is part of the Security Council-mandated capacity-building implementation plan for countering the flow of foreign terrorist fighters that the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force has developed. Taking an "All-of-UN" approach, the Office of Counter-Terrorism has developed the Plan, which currently includes 50 mutually reinforcing capacity-building projects that address the entire life cycle of the foreign terrorist fighters, including radicalizing, travelling, financing, returning, disarming, prosecuting, rehabilitating and reintegrating. The 13 United Nations CTITF agencies participate in the plan, and the total of the project budget is $107 million over five years. Contributions and pledges currently add up to $44 million, or 41 per cent of the total, and we encourage more Member States to contribute to that Plan.

Thirdly, the CTITF is active on addressing the threat of terrorists acquiring and using weapons of mass destruction. The recent use of chemical weapons by terrorist groups in certain regions shows that such threat is not simply theoretical. The implementation of the obligations under resolutions 1540 (2004) and 2325 (2016) are vital to preventing non-State actors from acquiring and using nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. An effective response to a weapons of mass destruction attack is also crucial.

Through the specialized CTITF Working Group, United Nations agencies and international organizations are working to improve their coordination mechanisms in emergency response to a chemical or biological weapons attack. That project has completed an analysis of existing United Nations coordination mechanisms and made recommendations for improvement, and also organized a simulation exercise that brought together 16 United Nations agencies to test their coordination in a hypothetical weapons of mass destruction terrorist attack situation.

To conclude, General Assembly resolution 70/291, adopted at the fifth review of the United Nations Global Counter- Terrorism Strategy, notes that member States should work together to:

> "eliminate the supply of weapons, including small arms and light weapons, to terrorists, as well as to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in said weapons, including their diversion, to terrorists" (*resolution 70/291, para. 61*).

The existing international legal framework against the flow of weapons to terrorists provides clear guidelines for all States in that regard.

Today's draft resolution is another step in the right direction. We at the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism through the Inter-Agency Working Groups of CTITF and United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre's capacity-building assistance, will actively support its implementation, working closely with member States and all relevant CTITF entities. As called for by the Secretary-General in his report (A/71/858), we are committed to stepping up our United Nations assistance to member States, and forging a new agenda for multi-lateral cooperation, including in countering the flow of weapons to terrorists.

Mr. President (*spoke in Arabic*): I thank Mr. Khan for his briefing.

I now give the floor to Mr. Weixiong Chen.

Mr. Weixiong Chen (*spoke in Chinese*): Today, the Security Council discusses the issue on preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons with a view to adopting a draft resolution on that topic, which is both significant and necessary.

(*spoke in English*)

In many of its resolutions, the Council has stressed the importance of preventing terrorists' access to weapons. The current draft resolution, once adopted, will add further tasks to the mandate of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) in this area. Under the policy guidance of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, CTED is required to monitor, facilitate and promote the implementation of the aforementioned resolutions by Member States and to support the policy development of the Committee and the Council and their efforts in defining the international counter-terrorism agenda.

We are proud to support the policy responses of the Committee and the Council on the broad range of counter-terrorism issues through our assessment

visits, our analyses and our identification of trends and challenges, gaps and good practices. Our analysis has reviewed a wide range of concerns with respect to terrorist access to weapons, including poor stockpiling management and shortcomings in monitoring the protection, control, sale, brokerage, export and imports of small arms and light weapons; looting of military arsenals; transnational organized crime; weak border controls; activated and deactivated weapons; and the international arms trade and trafficking via the Internet, in particular via the Dark Web markets.

Even though Member States have achieved significant progress in addressing these issues, further efforts are needed, including in the following areas.

First, reviewing and strengthening national legislation on countering the supply and trafficking of weapons to terrorists; second, strengthening national control regimes for the possession, use and transfer of weapons; third, ensuring that weapons held by defence and security forces are properly stored and controlled; fourth, preventing the flow of weapons to conflict-affected regions and conflict zones; fifth, strengthening professional and expert training, including through the provision of modern technology and equipment; sixth, effectively implementing arms embargoes, in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions; and seventh, strengthening and expanding cooperation and partnership with United Nations entities, international and regional organizations and civil society.

The country visit remains a critical tool for CTED. It enables us to assess Member States' overall national counter-terrorism efforts and their specific achievements, strengths, weaknesses and technical assistance needs and to identify and promote good practices. We will continue to make optimum use of this vital tool, including within the framework of post-visit information-sharing and in facilitating the delivery of technical assistance with our implementing agencies.

Cooperation with other United Nations entities and international and regional organizations is essential to CTED's work. In that regard, I would note that CTED is Chair of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force Working Group on Border Management and Law Enforcement Relating to Counter-Terrorism, and works closely with the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team pursuant to resolution 1526 (2014) and 2253 (2015), concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh); the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs; the United Nations Mine Action Service; the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; INTERPOL; the World Customs Organization and many other international and regional organizations.

CTED has also contributed to a number of initiatives, including the development of International Small Arms Control Standards, the INTERPOL Illicit Arms Records and Tracing Management System. Moreover, the CTED and INTERPOL recently signed a formal cooperation agreement that will enable us to deepen our cooperation in denying terrorists' access to weapons. It is also essential to raise Member States' awareness of this topic and promote related international good practices. In this regard, the Committee, with the support of CTED, has arranged a series of related thematic and regional briefings. CTED will continue to pay increased attention to new and emerging threats and trends, and strengthen its efforts to assist Member States to address new risks deriving from international arms trafficking via the Internet and across borders.

Just last week, Mr. President, under your leadership and stewardship as Chair of the Committee, CTED finalized the updated version of the Technical Guide to the Implementation of Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001), 1624 (2005), 2178 (2014) and other relevant Council resolutions and decisions. The Technical Guide serves as a comprehensive and unique reference tool, both for CTED and for Member States, in our joint efforts to counter a broad range of terrorist threats, including access to weapons.

Preventing and eliminating the supply of weapons to terrorists is a complex task, but rest assured that CTED will continue to strengthen its engagement with the United Nations entities and international and regional organizations, in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions, to assist Member States in denying terrorists access to weapons.

The President (*spoke in Arabic*): I thank Mr. Weixiong Chen for his briefing.

I now give the floor to Mr. Roux.

Mr. Roux (*spoke in French*): I deliver this briefing on behalf of our Secretary-General, Mr. Jürgen Stock.

(*spoke in English*)

It is a great privilege to address the Security Council once again. I would like to thank the Egyptian

presidency for convening this meeting and for their recognition of the role of the INTERPOL in this framework.

Preventing foreign terrorist fighters from accessing weapons is of utmost importance and is one of the five action streams in INTERPOL's Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. We have been reminded time and again that no country can claim itself immune from the threat. Yet this also means that we can all be part of the effort to stop their movement and break the supply. It is vital to mobilize international cooperation, not only across regions, but also across action domains ranging from international and domestic legislation to police work in the field. I therefore welcome Egypt's initiative to bring this issue to the forefront of discussions at the United Nations, and I look forward to the outcomes of today's meeting.

Although neither weapons nor their use by terrorists are new phenomena, today's threat landscape is one of unprecedented complexity. Convergence is the keyword — convergence between organized crime and terrorism; between old and new technologies; between military and law enforcement. We see firearms used in conflict zones reappear on the streets of major cities; legal commercial products turned into components for improvised explosive devices; and guns manufactured decades ago found reactivated and for sale in the marketplaces of the Dark Web. In parallel, foreign terrorist fighters may be exploiting the tactics and knowledge learned from the battlefield; the contacts and supply chains of organized crime groups they often used to belong to; and technology allowing the creation of modular firearms and 3D printing to access and use weapons.

The challenge may seem daunting. Where can we start in tackling these threats?

There are many crucial actions that the international community can undertake with the support and expertise of the United Nations. Standardizing end-user export controls, ensuring secure stockpile management and strengthening and implementing strong national legislation are all essential steps. Yet like the Secretary General of the world's largest law enforcement organization, and as a police officer myself, I must look at weapons trafficking from a narrower but equally pivotal focus on what frontline officers can do to prevent foreign terrorist fighters (FTF) from acquiring weapons and how international policing can assist them.

The first step involves tracing the weapon back to its source. That is where every single gun turns from being a threat into an asset for the purpose of police investigations. The gun might turn out to be part of an arsenal discovered by the military in a conflict zone. It might be found at the crime scene of an armed robbery or a murder. It might be recovered on a suspect or in the trunk of a car. Traditionally, investigations would end at that point, with the seizure of a firearm. INTERPOL suggests that the recovery of a weapon is just the beginning. Until proven otherwise, a gun used in the commission of a crime must be considered as part of a larger scheme, not an isolated piece of evidence. INTERPOL has developed a firearms recovery protocol, which has been made available to all member countries and provides a guide to obtaining the necessary intelligence and investigative leads to trace the source of the supply.

The questions for any investigator are simple but fundamental. First, who has had contact with the firearm? To answer that question, the identifying data obtained from the gun's exterior — the make, model, calibre, and serial number — should be checked so as to find its status and transaction history. INTERPOL's Illicit Arms Record and Tracing Management System (iARMS) can be used to search and trace lost, stolen, smuggled or trafficked firearms internationally. For instance, the iARMS platform was used to issue trace requests in the aftermath of the *Charlie Hebdo* terrorist attacks. More recently, INTERPOL-coordinated operations in the Balkans and Eastern Europe have shown how international tracing can become a multiplier, thereby leading to new weapon recoveries and arrests. In parallel, latent fingerprints and DNA can also be examined, where possible, through using INTERPOL's forensic databases, as well.

The next question is — in which crimes has the gun been used? The ballistics data from inside the gun can be used to link crimes, guns and suspects, whether through domestic ballistic comparison or across borders. In such cases, the INTERPOL Ballistic Information Network provides a means by which to conduct international searches to determine if the same gun was used in multiple crimes and crime scenes across different countries. The intelligence generated can help track a gun used in a crime to a trafficker and cut off a supply of firearms. Every hit in the system

and every subsequent link count. That is how key individuals can be identified, new trafficking routes detected and responses designed.

Secondly, we are focused on the weapons. We should never forget about the individuals. They are the ones driving the demand and ultimately putting those commodities to use. Preventing foreign terrorist fighters' access to weapons also builds on preventing their mobility across borders and achieving positive identification in the field. In that regard, I must emphasize once again the need to strengthen and integrate border management in compliance with resolution 2178 (2014). Since its adoption, we have witnessed FTF-related information sharing through INTERPOL channels increase dramatically. That momentum can be seized by maximizing the use of INTERPOL's first-line screening tools for travel documents and nominals at all borders in members' respective jurisdictions so as to set up a tripwire and an early warning system against terrorist mobility.

The same applies to known weapons traffickers who may be moving abroad to coordinate shipments and manage their operations, whether upstream towards the source, or downstream for distribution. If flagged through INTERPOL channels, any random search or border control may lead to the detection, identification and apprehension of such high-value players. In a nutshell, strong borders and improved coordination are the first defence in both FTF interdiction and preventing the illegal, cross-border movement of weapons.

The capabilities, which I have described, hold enormous potential in assisting law enforcement officers to prevent terrorist access to weapons. Yet in order to be unleashed, that requires proactive action. The databases must be populated, the trace requests sent and responded to, and the access to secure information system extended to border control points and other key frontline locations. I would respectfully ask each of the delegations represented here to reach out to their respective capitals and national security services and inquire whether that potential is being maximized at a time of unprecedented threats. INTERPOL stands ready to assist all member countries represented here today in that endeavour.

The President (*spoke in Arabic*): I thank Mr. Roux for his briefing.

The Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour:

Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation, Senegal, Sweden, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Uruguay

The President (*spoke in Arabic*): The draft resolution received 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution has been adopted unanimously as resolution 2370 (2017).

I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of Egypt.

First of all, I would like to express my appreciation to all those who participated in a constructive and positive manner in the negotiations that led to the adoption today of the important resolution 2370 (2017), especially as it is the first resolution of its kind to address in detail the problemterrorists from acquiring weapons. The importance of this issue made the Egyptian chairmanship of the Counter-Terrorism Committee eager to organize a briefing on the subject within the framework of the CTC in May 2017, with the participation of all United Nations Members and the relevant organizations. Based on the conclusions of that briefing, the Egyptian Mission was able to develop the first version of the resolution that was just adopted, withEgypt's commitment to taking into account the opinions and recommendations of every State, including those that are not members of the Security Council, while designing policies on counter-terrorism under its auspices.

Arming terrorists and terrorist groups is an extremely serious issue. I would even say that it involves a crime that is no less horrible than the terrorist act in and of itself. Providing terrorists with weapons means directly supplying them with the means that they will use to kill, destroy and terrorize populations, including women and children. It is therefore necessary for the international community, represented by the United Nations, to face up to this issue in earnest and decisively, and hold to account all of those who supply weapons to terrorists and terrorist groups. In that regard, resolution 2370 (2017), just adopted, contains very important

provisions at the national and international levels. Indeed, the resolution reaffirms the commitment of all States to preventing the provision of weapons to terrorists and, in that respect, it emphasizesthe need to implement the relevant Security Council resolutions.

The resolution stipulates that the Council will address cases of failure to implement its resolutions. Furthermore, it reiterates the need to prevent and avoid the smuggling of arms to terrorists in conflict zones. It reaffirms the importance of strengthening cooperation to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons via the Internet or social networks.

The resolution stresses the importance of international judicial cooperation and law enforcement to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons. The resolution requests that the Counter-Terrorism Committee and the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate, as well as the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team concerning the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant/Al-Qaida, each within its respective areas of competence, to give the necessary priority and focus to the issue of preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons.

We take this opportunity to restate what we have often said in the past regarding the need for the full implementation of Security Council resolutions, in particular those on counter-terrorism. We reiterate the need for the Security Council to hold those States that do not comply with the relevant resolutions accountable. All Council members should work to develop the political will within the Council to ensure that rogue States are held accountable when they expressly violate its resolutions.

In the past as now, Egypt has suffered, directly and indirectly, at the hands of certain States that support, arm and finance terrorists. That is what has led Egypt, in addition to its ongoing counter-terrorism efforts, to present the comprehensive and multidimensional vision of the counter-terrorism issue that was laid out in the statement delivered by President Al Sisi at the Riyadh Summit in May. Egypt also stresses the need for all States to comply with the relevant Security Council resolutions, which request the international community and individual States to fight terrorism and the regimes that support it by all means compatible with the Charter of the United Nations and international law.

In conclusion, I can assure Council members that Egypt will remain committed to being at the vanguard of international efforts to fight and defeat terrorism, while respecting international law, human rights and the rule of law.

I now resume my functions as President of the Security Council.

I give the floor to the other members of the Council who wish to make statements.

Mr. Rycroft (United Kingdom): I would like to begin by expressing my thanks to Ambassador Liu Jieyi and his team for a very successful presidency last month, and to welcome Ambassador Nebenzia, our new Russian colleague, to the Security Council.

I should like to wish you, Sir, all the very best for the month ahead as President of the Security Council. You have got us off to a flying start with the unanimous adoption of resolution 2370 (2017) today, which the United Kingdom is very pleased to support. I hope that you have started the month as you mean to go on, because there is a lot to do together and we need to maintain the unity and activism of this morning as we grapple with the challenges of the month ahead. There is no greater challenge than the unrelenting scourge of terrorism. It is a threat that we all face and that we must all unite to defeat.

Through the resolution adopted today, we have committed to taking practical steps to do just that, first, by stopping terrorists' deadly use of explosive devices, and secondly by stopping their illegal supply of small arms and light weapons. We need only look to Mosul — to its ruined buildings and ruined lives — to see that these weapons and explosives are crucial enablers of the brutality of groups like Da'esh. Over three years, Da'esh used small arms and light weapons and explosive devices to impose its sick ideology on the people of Mosul, systematically persecuting anyone who dared to stand in its way. Three years on, thanks to the bravery of the Iraqi security forces, Da'esh has now been defeated in Mosul. But not content with years of brutality, Da'esh has left behind a bitter, bloody legacy for those returning home — a city littered with booby traps and other improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

We must make no mistake — the indiscriminate use of these devices goes against the basic tenets of international humanitarian law and the basic tenets of human decency. That is why the United Kingdom is committed to developing practical approaches that reduce the use and availability of improvised explosive

devices. It is why we have committed to spending $129 million over the next three years to tackle the problem of IEDs, explosive remnants of war and land mines. And it is why we are committed to developing an effective and informed network across the international community that will help track key components and prevent the manufacturer of these devices. In parallel, we need to do more to combat the illicit trafficking and, crucially, the diversion of small arms and light weapons. It is not enough just to investigate and dispose of illicit weapons; we must prevent the moment when a legal weapon becomes diverted to illegal use.

The Arms Trade Treaty remains the most important instrument at our disposal to do that. It is a robust, effective, legally binding treaty, and one that took years to agree. We must use it to its fullest extent, drawing on its transparent and consistent standards to regulate the global arms trade. I therefore strongly urge all States to join the Arms Trade Treaty. The Council has already made a call on the international community to consider signing and ratifying that vital instrument, captured in the most comprehensive resolution adopted on small arms and light weapons — resolution 2220 (2015). I deeply regret that we were unable today to repeat that call unanimously, but we may rest assured that the Arms Trade Treaty will remain central to the United Kingdom's approach to preventing irresponsible trafficking in arms.

Before I cede the floor, I think it is important to recognize that the words in resolution 2370 (2017) are only as good as their implementation outside the Chamber. As an example, it is simply not good enough to express our support for arms embargoes mandated by the Security Council in the resolution if we are unwilling to make them a reality in areas of genuine need around the world. If we look at South Sudan, last year the Council had a real chance to take steps to lessen the carnage caused by the uncontrolled flow of weapons there, and yet when we voted to impose an arms embargo we failed.

The United Kingdom maintains that it is long past time for us to return to that issue, and when we do I hope that we will channel some of the fervour for arms embargoes that we found in the resolution adopted today.

Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): I would like to begin, Mr. President, by congratulating you at the outset of the Egyptian presidency and thanking the Chinese delegation once again for its capable leadership of the Security Council's work in July. I am also grateful for the words of support addressed to me and to my colleagues. I have already had the opportunity to assure my colleagues that I have come here with the hope and intention of working constructively with them with the aim of helping to solve the problems facing the international community.

It so happens that the first official meetings of both the General Assembly and the Security Council that I have had the opportunity to participate in as Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation have been devoted to the issue of combating terrorism. For our country, the topic is an absolute priority for the forum of the United Nations, where we must all work diligently to unite the international community's efforts to confront that universal evil.

We are grateful to Egypt for organizing today's meeting and to today's briefers for their substantive contributions to our discussion. We would like to highlight the activities of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate in proposing and providing specialized technical assistance. We firmly believe that the United Nations system's newly created Office for Counter-Terrorism will enable us to expand their work's impact, and the efforts that have been undertaken through INTERPOL and other specialized organizations are significant in that regard.

My delegation supported the Council's adoption today of resolution 2370 (2017), on the issue of weapons falling into terrorists' hands. As the resolution notes, States should work to suppress any kind of support to terrorists, including commercial, economic and financial ties. In laying out these provisions, the Security Council also urges all States to intensify their efforts to secure their borders. We hope that message will be heard. Despite the international community's efforts, the massive flow of arms to terrorists from outside continues. The fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the other terrorist organizations in Syria and Iraq has gone on almost as long as the Second World War, and in all that time, the militants have never experienced any disruption in their supply of arms and ammunition, including the most up-to-date types, and they continue to use these weapons. Only today the Russian Embassy in Damascus was again shelled from terrorist groups' positions. Even with the effective offensive currently

under way, ISIL's resources, though reduced, are still unacceptably high. They can be enabled only through a large-scale, systematic, reliable supply of arms to terrorists that continues even now and would not be possible without the connivance, if not the assistance, of State organizations.

The solution to the problem that we have consistently proposed for years is an initiative that would impose a comprehensive trade and economic embargo on territories controlled by ISIL, with the goal of banning the import and export of all goods to or from ISIL-controlled territories and imposing financial restrictions and strengthening border security in Syria and Iraq's neighbours, because the information that we have shows that their border controls have been ineffective. Unfortunately, our proposals, which could significantly strengthen the impact of the resolution we have adopted today, have once again met with stubborn resistance from various delegations. Their unwillingness to go down the road of tightening controls on the circulation of arms in the region plays into the hands of international terrorism. We continue to be puzzled as to why this is the case and whose interests it serves. We are wasting an opportunity to make an effective joint decision. More than that, we are wasting time. The terrorists are exploiting this situation, preserving their combat potential and clearly assuming that some of their sponsors, including State structures, will continue to support them.

Of course, international arms dealers such as, for example, private companies, significantly enhanced their activities on a background of the crises that have erupted in the Middle East and North Africa and that feed the wanton greed of the world's notorious arms lords. In their pursuit of profits or political goals, suppliers frequently prefer to turn a blind eye to whatever the destination and purpose of the batch of arms they are exporting may be or whose hands it may ultimately end up in. The numerous middlemen operating in the market sometimes fail to exercise the appropriate responsibilityonsibility. States that have accumulated excessive stockpiles of small arms and light weapons are not always as careful as they should be with their supplies. The production of weapons under expired licences, or without a licence from the countries that own the relevant technology, continues to be a serious problem. With a view to solving these problems, we have repeatedly proposed strengthening the concrete national measures in Security Council resolutions that could significantly reduce the risk of small arms and light weapons falling into the hands of terrorist organizations. We note that in adopting today's resolution, the Council has acknowledged the need for improving legislation in these areas, but any specifics have gone by the board.

We all know that where there are military conflicts of this type, private companies can do only what States allowed them to do. Russia has sufficient information from trustworthy sources to confirm the fact that there are States that condone such activity and that a number of countries' interested agencies, including special services, are frequently involved in supplying arms to terrorists. If necessary, we are ready to share particulars of that data. We consider such a state of affairs unacceptable and we will continue to take steps aimed at using the international community's joint efforts to deal with it.

In conclusion, we would once again like to affirm Russia's willingness to cooperate multilaterally with the United Nations counter-terrorism entities, including on the problem of arms supplies, and we urge all delegations to work actively to that end.

Mrs. Haley (United States of America): I would like to congratulate you, Mr. President, on Egypt's presidency of the Council for the month of August, and on starting it off in a very good way, especially for your negotiations on something that draw attention to an important issue such as this one, for which we thank you.

We know that terrorists have many ways to get their hands on dangerous weapons. They divert legal arms transfers, take advantage of poorly secured stockpiles, seize weapons on the battlefield and get them through criminal networks. The Council's adoption today of resolution 2370 (2017) is meant to address the many ways in which terrorists acquire arms. It calls on Member States to do more to strengthen export controls and assist other countries in destroying excess weapons. It highlights the importance of enhancing the physical security of weapons and stockpiles and of establishing tracing programmes for them. It trains a spotlight on the murderous potential of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). It encourages cooperation between the public and private sectors in preventing the transfer of IEDs, drones and light weapons to terrorist organizations. Most importantly, it calls attention to the obligation of all nations, particularly those that

profess concerns about weapons falling into terrorists' hands, to enforce United Nations arms embargoes. The Security Council has been clear in prohibiting arms transfers to Yemen, Somalia and other places. And yet we know that weapons continue to flow across borders in open violation of the Council's resolutions. For some Member States, this is an issue of extreme hypocrisy. For all of us, it is an unacceptable stain on the Council's authority that must be removed.

It is true that in recent months we have made great progress against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham (ISIS) and Al-Qaida. We are pleased that regional partners have taken steps to improve their ability to cut ISIS off from financial and material support. But it is not merely some members' failure to take action that is enabling weapons to find their way to terrorists. One country stands out for its deliberate and systematic contributions of arms, training and funding to terrorist groups. One country uses its support to terrorist proxies as a way to conduct its foreign policy and compensate for its own weakness. That country is Iran. The United States first designated Iran a State sponsor of terrorism in 1984. Its training, funding and arming of terrorists has continued unabated to this day. Terrorist proxies are doing the Iranian regime's will in Iraq and Syria. Iran also supports Hamas and Bahraini terrorist groups. Through its partner Hizbullah, Iran is engaged in preparing for war in Lebanon. It is building an arsenal of weapons and battle-hardened troops.

We applaud the message at the heart of today's resolution that says that the international community must work together and do more to prevent weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists. But I encourage the Council to be aware that weapons do not always just "fall" into the hands of terrorists. Too often, they are pushed. That is the threat that we face today in Iran and it is a threat that no amount of technical cooperation or security upgrades will diminish. As long as we allow the Iranian regime to violate the Council's prohibitions with impunity, Iran will be a source of weapons to terrorist groups that will only grow in volume and destructive capability. The United States will continue to raise the issue of Iraninan non-compliance with international obligations at every opportunity.

Mr. Sadykov (Kazakhstan): At the outset, I would like to congratulate Egypt on assuming the presidency of the Council for the month of August. It has laid out a very comprehensive coverage of key items on our agenda. Likewise, I offer our most sincere appreciation to the Chinese presidency for its very capable and outstanding stewardship of the Council in July.

I also congratulate and welcome Ambassador Vassily Nebenzia as the new Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation and look forward to working with his delegation to take the work of the Council forward.

Our delegation offers its condolences to Afghanistan for the most recent terrorist attack in Herat province and, like others, we condemn the attack in the strongest terms. Our thoughts are with the families of the victims and we wish a speedy recovery to those injured in the attack.

The delegation of Kazakhstan welcomes the adoption of resolution 2370 (2017) on preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons, which was put forth by Egypt. The resolution will significantly enhance our effectiveness in countering the illicit arms flow and monitoring the arms embargo. It will also contribute to the efforts of the United Nations in the framework of the Arms Trade Treaty and implementing resolution 2220 (2015) on the illicit transfer and misuse of small arms and light weapons.

We are convinced that the only effective way to prevent weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists and terrorist groups is to create and effectively implement relevant norms at the national, regional and international levels. The international community needs to expand its cooperation and interactions in order to include a more rapid and timely exchange of information providing, if necessary, full support to carry out activities to identify and prevent the acquisition of arms or suppress the intentions of terrorists to illegally acquire weapons. That collaboration should be at the regional and global levels. It should involve the mechanisms of international and regional organizations, primarily the United Nations system, including sanctions committees.

The United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and the Monitoring Team of the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida,and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, along with other sanctions committees, play an important role. In addition, it is necessary to take measures to disclose and eliminate sources of the financing of terrorist groups and their accomplices.

Particular attention should be paid to strengthening national expert control mechanisms.

When exporting weapons and dual-use technologies, mandatory verification of end-user certificates should be carried out in strict compliance with sanctions regimes for the supply of weapons. Despite the fact that resolution 2370 (2017) updated provisions related to strengthening control over and preventing conventional weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists, it is appropriate to highlight the efforts and aspirations of terrorist groups to obtain weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, it is necessary to raise levels of security in order to protect facilities containing nuclear, chemical and biological materials, as well as their components and manufacturing technologies. It is necessary to strengthen control and determine appropriate conditions for personnel who are allowed to work with them. Kazakhstan pays special attention to the physical protection of nuclear facilities and infrastructure, as well as other facilities that have abundant potential to draw criminal and terrorist groups interested in acquiring nuclear and other materials for creating dirty bombs.

Kazakhstan is a committed member of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which was launched by the United States of America and the Russian Federation in order to strengthen the interaction of the international community in preventing nuclear materials from falling into the hands of terrorists. As part of the global fight against the illicit trade in conventional arms and their transfer and use for terrorist purposes, we believe that the following important tools should be used.

First, we must improve domestic procedures for issuing permits for the transfer of conventional weapons. We must also improve the reporting of all States. That includes harmonizing legislation among countries of the region, helping countries in passing national legislation and with their ability to take action, strengthening control over the targeted use, transfer and supply of conventional weapons, as well as ensuring liability provided for by national laws for violations. We must improve customs mechanisms and legislation and strengthen control over borders in order to prevent trafficking across countries. That can be done through the training of specialists and providing equipment. It is also necessary to support all forms of capacity-building between States through bilateral cooperation, North-South cooperation, South-South cooperation and trilateral cooperation. Therefore, Kazakhstan stands ready to join the multilateral effort to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons that imperil peace and security.

Mr. Skau (Sweden): Let me join others in congratulating Egypt on assuming the presidency for the month of August. We wish Egypt all the best.

I would also like to thank the Chinese delegation for an impressively effective presidency in July.

I would also like to take the opportunity to welcome our new colleague, Ambassador Vassily Nebenzia as the new Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation.

I would like to thank Egypt for organizing today's briefing. I would also like to thank the briefers for their valuable presentations.

International terrorism is clearly one of the greatest threats to international peace and security. The fight against terrorism requires greater cooperation across national borders and across policy areas. In that regard, we thank Egypt for introducing resolution 2370 (2017), which was just adopted. A coordinated response is necessary in order to eliminate the supply of weapons to terrorists and to prevent the illicit trade of weapons. The relevant national law enforcement agencies need to cooperate and share information in order to combat illicit firearms trafficking, as well as to ensure adequate marking and tracing procedures for weapons. The full implementation of existing multilateral agreements, such as the Arms Trade Treaty; the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects; the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons; and the United Nations Firearms Protocol are also essential in preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons. Moreover, Security Council arms embargos must be fully respected and properly implemented, in accordance with relevant resolutions and legal instruments.

Today, we would have liked to see the Council urge all Member States to accede to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) . The ATT is the first legally binding instrument for the regulation of the international arms trade. In order to achieve the effective control of arms flows, it is important that all arms-producing countries accede to the Treaty. Illegal arms are usually start off

as legally produced and traded weapons. However, their irresponsible export can cause as much damage as and lead to illegal flows. Furthermore, it is crucial that importing countries join the ATT, as inadequate control leads to the diversion of arms to the illegal market. Transit countries should also join, as they risk becoming unwitting links in the physical shipment of arms to conflict areas.

Resolution 1540 (2004) is also a very important resolution in that context. It aims to stop non-State actors, notably terrorists, from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Resolution 2370 (2017) constitutes an important complement to resolution 1540 (2004), since it encompasses conventional arms and the illicit flows of small arms and light weapons, as well as explosive elements for the manufacture of improvised explosive devises.

In conclusion, let me underline that all counter-terrorism measures must be carried out in accordance with international law, including international human rights law, humanitarian law and refugee law, as reiterated in numerous resolutions. Human rights and fundamental freedoms, online as well as offline, and open societies are critical for fostering resilience against terrorism. Member States working together, based on these agreed norms and standards, is the only and most effective way to counter the great threat of international terrorism. Our hope is that resolution 2370 (2017), which we have just adopted, and this meeting will contribute to those efforts.

Mr. Llorenty Solíz (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (*spoke in Spanish*): At the outset, allow me to echo the words of gratitude and congratulations directed to Ambassador Liu Jieyi for the excellent work carried out during China's presidency of the Security Council in July. I also congratulate you, Mr. President, and your team on your assumption of the presidency of the Council and assure you of our support and my delegation's readiness to cooperate with you. We, too, welcome the new Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation, Mr. Vasilly Nebenzia.

I wish also to thank Mr. Yury Fedotov, Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; Mr. Jehangir Khan, Officer in Charge of the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism; Mr. Weixiong Chen, Deputy Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate; and Mr. Emmanuel Roux, Special Representative of INTERPOL to the United Nations.

I wish also to thank the Egyptian presidency for having submitted to the Council resolution 2370 (2017), which we deem particularly important given the current context and the global challenges that we are facing. We congratulate Egypt on the work it did to ensure the unanimous adoption of the resolution, which is a clear reflection of the spirit of cooperation that we must maintain in order to confront the scourge of terrorism. We express our support for the ongoing efforts of the Counter-Terrorism Committee and the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, as well as the recently created United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism.

The Plurinational State of Bolivia, in line with its policies aimed at peace, categorically condemns all acts of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations as criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of their motivation and wherever and by whomsoever committed, as this is one of the most serious threats to international peace and security. That is why we stress the urgency of implementing the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

Bolivia is Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), which is charged with promoting efforts to strengthen the exchange of information and knowledge between United Nations entities and international organizations, with the specific purpose of ensuring that States, inter alia, refrain from supplying any kind of support to non-State actors attempting to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use, in this case, nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their delivery systems. The Committee therefore seeks to promote international cooperation, and the resolution that we have just adopted is, as has been noted, a fitting complement to the Committee's mandate.

My country wishes also to underscore the content of resolution 2370 (2017), which stresses the need for inter-State cooperation aimed at preventing any kind of active or passive support for entities or individuals involved in terrorist acts. We reaffirm the need for States to combat this human scourge by all peaceful means set out in the Charter of the United Nations and stress that measures to prevent it must be in line with the obligations incumbent upon us by under international law and the relevant international conventions and protocols, in

particular human rights conventions, refugee law and international humanitarian law. However, we believe that such cooperation and technical assistance should be provided at the request of States and should not be viewed as another element of interference or political exploitation, and should be specifically aimed at building national capacities.

Bolivia believes that the international community's responsibility to combat this global problem must be based on a common but differentiated approach in which weapons-producing countries must acknowledge their own responsibility, which differs from that of those countries that suffer the consequences of the broad availability of weapons that undermine peace and threaten the lives of people living on the territories affected as a result of weapons being obtained by those who intend to carry out terrorist acts.

We deplore the fact that some international treaties do not address the structural causes of this issue. Weapons manufacturing is focused on profit and promotes human suffering. Bolivia rejects war and along with it the entire industry that funds it.

Today we must focus on preventing the sale of weapons to those intending to commit terrorist acts. To that end Bolivia, in the context of the preventive measures that it has taken, enacted in 2013 a law regulating firearms, munitions, explosives and other related materials. The goal of the law is to ensure peaceful coexistence and safeguard the lives of the people and prevent, combat and punish crimes related to the illicit traffic of firearms as well as crimes against the security and defence of the State and civilian security by regulating the manufacture, import, export, storage and commercialization of firearms, munitions, explosives and other materials.

In this context, we believe that in the context of preventive measures we should focus in particular on the financial mechanisms that make it possible to launder the profits of the illegal arms trade, including so-called tax havens.

Terrorism today, both locally and globally, is the major challenge that we are facing, and it is for that reason that we call on the Security Council to unite its efforts to combat this scourge through greater international cooperation, with full respect for international law and the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

Mr. Lambertini (Italy): Italy welcomes the unanimous adoption of resolution 2370 (2017), adopted today, as a substantial step forward in the international community's commitment to combat the scourge of terrorism. It is a very good way, Sir, to start your presidency, on which we congratulate you and wish you all the best. We wish also to thank Ambassador Liu Jieyi and his team for their remarkable presidency in July. If I may say so, it is good to have among us so important a colleague and one with the name of one of the main characters of Giacomo Puccini's Turandot, which is one of the best operas ever written, so I congratulate Ambassador Liu Jieyi. I also warmly welcome Ambassador Nebenzia; we are ready to work together as usual.

I should like also to take this opportunity to thank our four briefers from New York and Vienna for their important contributions to our discussion.

Illegal trafficking in weapons is a threat to peace and security in every region of the world. Every day we see the consequences of the ease with which individual criminals and organized groups, including terrorist groups, obtain and make use of such tools. The illicit transfer and misuse of small arms and light weapons contribute to instability and security and continue to undermine the effectiveness of States' development efforts. According to the World Bank, illicit trafficking in weapons represents one of the most profitable activities of organized criminal groups. The revenue generated through this illegal market is equal to 20 per cent of the legal arms trade.

Weapons may fall into the hands of terrorists because of poor stockpile security and weak border control. The activities of foreign terrorist fighters further increase the probability that weapons and ammunition will cross borders. In recent years the international community has also been confronted with the threat posed by the increasing use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), particularly by non-State armed groups and rogue individuals. Such IED attacks deliberately target concentrations of civilians so as to achieve maximum lethality, terror and social disruption.

The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant has used IEDs since its inception. However, despite sustained military pressure, the group has been able to develop a capacity to assemble such devices on an industrial scale and, as current Chair of the Mine Action Support Group, we have seen the proliferation of these instruments and

the creativity shown in that respect. Terrorists' access to small arms and light weapons has also been facilitated by the spread of an online marketplace. The illegal sale of arms on the dark Web presents challenges for law enforcement agencies and national Governments. The anonymity enabled by that platform makes preventing illegal trade and linking it to specific individuals extremely difficult.

Last May, the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate held an open briefing aimed at analysing and discussing emerging threats, trends and developments relating to preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons and to identifying gaps in Member States' efforts to address those issues. During the briefings, the experts underlined, inter alia, links between organized crime and terrorism in illicit trafficking, including trafficking in weapons, as well as the need for an integrated approach.

In resolution 2322 (2016), the Security Council stated that it counts on States to continue sharing information on individuals and entities implicated in terrorist activity, in particular their supply of weapons and certain material support. INTERPOL highlighted a tool that enables information exchange and enhanced cooperation among law-enforcement agencies with regard to the international movement of illicit firearms and licit firearms that have been involved in committing a crime.

Italy has actively participated with the European Union in elaborating ways to curb the destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons and their ammunition, and we will continue to offer our cooperation to interested States, in particular on the role of up-to-date technologies and on best practices in physical security and stockpile management, in addition to the marking and tracing of weapons.

However, it is important to recall the need to guarantee a clear-cut separation between the legal manufacturing and marketing of arms as opposed to their illegal versions, which hamper the authorities' control and contribute, among other things, to financing and participation in criminal and terrorist groups. In that regard, the Arms Trade Treaty represents a balanced, broad-based text, resulting from a comprehensive and inclusive negotiation process in which the views of all Member States have been reflected. That instrument has the potential to significantly contribute to international peace and security by regulating the international trade in conventional arms, making it more responsible and transparent and eradicating illicit trafficking.

In conclusion, Italy looks forward to working together with partners and relevant stakeholders towards a stronger outcome in the next 2018 Small Arms and Light Weapons Review Conference, which should present an opportunity to reinforce our common action aimed at preventing terrorists from accessing those types of weapons.

Mr. Alemu (Ethiopia): I would like to join others in congratulating you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the presidency for the month of August, and I assure you of our fullest cooperation and support in the effective discharge of your responsibilities. I also wish to express appreciation to you for organizing this briefing on preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons. We are grateful to all the speakers for their informative briefings. Ethiopia commends Egypt for its leadership in facilitating the negotiation on resolution 2370 (2017) and welcomes its unanimous adoption. I would also like to express, more formally, my appreciation to Ambassador Liu Jieyi and China for their very successful presidency last month. I would also like to say how pleased we are to welcome the Russian Permanent Representative, Ambassador Vassily Nebenzya.

Access by terrorists to weapons, both conventional weapons and small arms and light weapons, poses a serious threat to the maintenance of peace and security, particularly in the context of countries affected by conflict. We endorse all that the President said when speaking in his national capacity. The proliferation of weapons that end up in the hands of terrorists has increased, mainly owing to transnational organized crime, poor border management, illicit arms-trafficking, including using the Internet, and gaps in export control and end-user verification. That, in turn, continues to pose a significant challenge to the implementation of the mandates of peacekeeping missions, the provision of humanitarian assistance and the protection of civilians.

The threat posed by improvised explosive devices (IEDs), particularly in the context of asymmetrical warfare, continues to lead to enormous challenges. For instance, in Somalia, IEDs are an increasingly mortal component of the al-Shabab arsenal as they become larger and more sophisticated, inflicting loss of life on civilians and peacekeepers. They also

continue to threaten the operations of humanitarian organizations, as well as the safety, security and livelihoods of internally displaced persons returning to their homes. That is mainly associated with the illicit flow of explosive elements in dual-use items that could be used for the manufacture of IEDs, and with gaps in controlling and regulating their use.

Those growing threats, resulting mainly from the increased supply of weapons, require all Member States to adopt a comprehensive approach that would integrate and coordinate their measures at the national, regional and international levels, as appropriate, and enhance their cooperation. The cross-border and international nature of the challenge also requires all of us to adopt a multilateral response, complimenting measures taken at the national level by Member States within their jurisdictions.

It is also critical for Member States to address some of the challenges in the context of broader disarmament discussions. It is in that context that we recognize the importance of various measures incorporated in resolution 2370 (2017), which we adopted today, aimed at eliminating the supply of weapons to terrorists within the framework of resolution 1373 (2001).

Resolution 1373 (2001) imposes a Chapter VII legal obligation on all Member States to refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts, which includes the elimination of the supply of weapons to terrorists. It requires Member States to take concrete measures to refrain from providing any form of support, which may include financing, training or harbouring terrorists.

It also requires Member States to prevent terrorists from acquiring conventional weapons and small arms and light weapons. It is therefore important for the Council to take into account the multi-faceted aspects of direct or indirect support to terrorists and adopt a broader outlook when addressing the issue of the access to weapons by terrorists as called for by resolution 2370 (2017). In that regard, I would like to underline the critical role that the various sanctions committees can and should play in ensuring the proper implementation of relevant arms embargoes and in eliminating the supply of weapons to terrorists.

I would like to conclude by reiterating our firm commitment to the fight against terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and by expressing our readiness to work with all the relevant actors in the implementation of the important resolution 2370 (2017) to prevent and eliminate the supply of weapons to terrorists.

Mr. Liu Jieyi (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): At the outset, I would like to congratulate you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of August. We are confident that under your and your team's guidance the Council will be very effective in its work during the month. China will fully cooperate with the presidency. I thank members of the Council for their expressions of appreciation to China during our presidency of the Council last month. We thank members of the Council for their cooperation.

I welcome the new Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation, Ambassador Vassily Nebenzia, to the United Nations.

China appreciates the Egyptian initiative in convening this meeting, and thanks the briefers: Executive Directors Fedotov and Khan, Acting Executive Director of Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate Chen, and INTERPOL Special Representative Roux.

China welcomes the unanimous adoption of Security Council resolution 2370 (2017), and we thank Egypt for the important efforts it has made in that connection. We hope that the resolution will further facilitate the strengthening of cooperation and taking comprehensive measures within the international community aimed at cutting off the channels that enable terrorist organizations to acquire weapons, thereby safeguarding regional and international peace and security:

First, the international community must use uniform standards in combating terrorism so as to plug loopholes that may make weapons available to terrorist organizations. The various Security Council resolutions clearly stipulate that all States shall refrain from providing any form of support, including weapons, to entities and persons involved in terrorist acts. All States should fully and strictly implement the relevant Council resolutions, giving particular effect to the provisions on the arms embargo and the monitoring mechanism. Only through Council-defined uniform standards and comprehensive and effective measures can we cut off the pathways through which terrorist organizations acquire weapons. We must plug all loopholes that allow the transfer of weapons between terrorist organizations or give them opportunities to undertake terrorist acts.

Secondly, Member States should play their appropriate role by assuming their primary responsibility to prevent terrorist organizations from acquiring weapons. All countries must, within their jurisdiction, exercise enhanced control and supervision over weapons production, storage and transportation, and their transfer. Countries must suppress any illicit arms trade, trafficking and smuggling, which supply weapons to terrorist organizations. Countries should also continuously improve their legislation, regulations and administrative processes so as to establish an international institutional framework that is guaranteed to prevent terrorist organizations from acquiring weapons from arms-trafficking criminal networks.

Thirdly, Member States should step up international and regional counter-terrorist cooperation forming synergies and interconnectivities aimed at preventing terrorist organizations from acquiring weapons. Countries should enhance the sharing and exchange of information pertaining to the ways and means by which terrorist organizations buy weapons. We must draw on one another's good practices and experience in combating illegal trafficking and the transfer and production of weapons and improvised explosive devices.

The United Nations counter-terrorism entities should focus on the new trends and characteristics identified in counter-terrorism efforts, and the Organization should fully play its role as a coordinator in multilateral counter-terrorism efforts. Moreover, at the request of Member States, those entities should provide technical support in order to build up their capacity in that regard.

It is imperative to step up efforts and cooperation in blocking the use of the Internet and social media by terrorists in acquiring weapons and funds.

China participates actively in many multilateral mechanisms, including the United Nations, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum. The 17th meeting of the heads of State of the SCO was recently held in Kazakhstan. At that summit, the SCO Convention on Countering Extremism was signed. China called for enhancing the regional counter-terrorism mechanism and offered once again to host the SCO online counter-terrorism exercise.

That shows that China and other relevant countries are making efforts to enhance regional counter-terrorism initiatives. China looks forward to the translation of the outcome of this meeting today into new measures to strengthen international counter-terrorism cooperation.

Mr. Lisuchenko (Ukraine): At the outset, I would like to join others in congratulating Egypt on its assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of July. I thank the delegation of Egypt for convening today's meeting and also thank the briefers for their insightful inputs for our discussion.

So far this year we have witnessed a rather effective international campaign aimed at dismantling the core of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant in the Middle East and at weakening its presence in other parts of the world, mainly through resolute military efforts on the ground. However, that could not have been achieved without depriving terrorists of their sources of financing and especially weapons supplies. Significant progress on that track has been made in Iraq, Syria and in certain parts of Africa.

Today, the persistence of the terrorist threat makes it imperative to strengthen existing mechanisms for the sake of prohibiting the acquisition, production, storage, transfer and use of weapons by terrorist groups. In that context, we consider today's resolution 2370 (2017), which introduces a multifaceted approach linking two dimensions, namely, counter-terrorism and arms control, to be an important step in that direction.

Although today's resolution focuses mainly on small arms and light weapons as a primary tool used by terrorists in various regions of the world, there are also alarming signs that even more sophisticated weapons are within the reach of determined terrorist groups. To prevent them from acquiring such weapons, strict measures must be implemented at the national level to strengthen export and border controls, in particular regulations on the transfer of weapons and other sensitive military equipment or matériel, and to bolster financial intelligence cooperation.

That relates, inter alia, to ensuring the protection and security of national stockpiles; addressing illicit brokering activities; the thorough checking of end-users' backgrounds; tracing trade routes for weapons and identifying countries known as transshipment points for terrorist organizations; enhancing border security; and tracking suspicious money transfers.

In that regard, we consider the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light

Weapons, the International Tracing Instrument and the Arms Trade Treaty as important tools that can significantly contribute to that process and pave the way for resolving the problem of illicit trafficking in weapons in all its aspects, reduce the scale of terrorist violence and subsequently end the spread of this scourge worldwide.

The international regime that seeks to curb arms supplies to terrorists runs into a problem when States that are supposed to uphold that regime turn out to be in breach of their international obligations and commitments in that regard. One of the most telling cases of our times is the continuing flooding of the occupied territories in eastern Ukraine with all kinds of weapon systems, all coming from the neighbouring State. Over 400 battle tanks, 840 armoured personnel vehicles, 200 multiple-launch rocket systems, 730 artillery systems and 400 air-defence units have been provided to terrorist organizations operating there.

Those deadly supplies have been used to conduct devastating terrorist attacks, including, for example, the downing of Malaysian Airlines flight MH-17. The rhetorical question is, how did the terrorist organizations in Ukraine get weapons that surpass the armament stocks of many European States, or why do the terrorists not run out of munitions?

Today, we adopted a document that clearly defines the scope of States' obligations with regard to eliminating the supply of weapons to terrorists. Having unanimously backed today's Security Council resolution, all countries around this table undertook to respect the obligation not to support and supply terrorists with weapons. We expect that all countries, first and foremost, those that voted for today's resolution, will remain faithful to both the letter and spirit of the relevant norms of international law.

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize the importance of bringing to justice those who knowingly engage in providing terrorists with weapons, funds and other types of assets. The suppliers of weapons and other sponsors and masterminds of terrorist activities should bear no lesser responsibility than those who perpetrate crimes on the ground.

Mr. Seck (Senegal) (*spoke in French*): The Senegalese delegation welcomes the holding of this Security Council meeting on preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons, which is being held at the very beginning of the Egyptian presidency and which we hope will be constructive. I can assure you, Sir, of the full support of the Senegalese delegation in the discharge of your important task.

I would also like to take this opportunity to thank our briefers today for the quality of their briefings, which reaffirm our conviction of the imperative need to prevent terrorists from acquiring all weapons at all costs, including conventional weapons, weapons of mass destruction and cyberweapons. I would, in that connection, like to thank Mr. Yury Fedotov, Mr. Jehangir Khan, Mr. Weixiong Chen and Mr. Emmanuel Roux.

After having procured and transferred the funds necessary for financing their activities and having implemented an efficient communications strategy, including through the dark Net, and recruited and trained combatants to carry out operations, terrorist groups need to acquire the weapons and the technical and logistical means to execute their cynical plans. It was with that in mind that the Security Council, which is responsible for providing the international community with the means needed to prevent and, where relevant, eliminate those multiple threats, adopted several resolutions, including resolutions 1373 (2001) and 2195 (2014) on financing terrorist activities, resolution 2178 (2014) on the recruitment of foreign terrorist fighters, and resolution 2354 (2017) on a comprehensive international framework to counter-terrorism narratives, as well as travel bans that affect a number of terrorist groups. It is for those reasons that Senegal voted in favour of resolution 2370 (2017), which we have just unanimously adopted, with the hope that it can provide one of the missing pieces in the framework for preventing terrorism. Accordingly, I would like once again to thank the Egyptian delegation for having initially proposed it.

In that resolution, the Security Council reaffirms its decision to prohibit all forms of support, whether active or passive, for entities or individuals involved in terrorist acts, including by eliminating every possible means of supplying such support to terrorists. The resolution calls on Member States to take the necessary legal measures against anyone who deliberately provides arms to terrorists and to ensure the secure management of small arms and light weapons, improve their traceability and strengthen capacities in the legal sphere, as well as in the technical area of border control. In the same vein, in calling on Member States to fully implement the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and

Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, the resolution pays particular attention to improvised explosive devices, as well as other non-conventional weapons. Accordingly, we welcome the attention accorded to arms embargoes in the resolution as an important means of controlling the influx of arma.

The Senegalese delegation is, however, of the opinion that the resolution just adopted would have gained in scope had it integrated the obligation incumbent on Member States to prevent the direct or indirect delivery, the sale, and the transfer of weapons to terrorists originating in their territories or with regard to terrorism carried out by their citizens. Although it is not included in the text of the resolution, that obligation warrants the full attention of the Security Council at a time when we are intensifying our efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons. My country therefore regrets the resolution's failure to mention disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes in countries and regions affected by conflict, while, even according to the fifth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da'esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering that threat (S/2017/467), the return of foreign terrorist fighters to their country of origin or their immigration to other countries represents one of the most pressing challenges facing the international community.

Given the growing number of conflicts throughout world, especially in Africa, we fear that terrorist groups and other combatants could use poorly executed disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes to their advantage so as to draw demobilized troops into their ranks, which is a possibility that could also aggravate the problem of porous borders. That is why in his 2006 report, entitled "Uniting against terrorism: recommendations for a global counter-terrorism strategy", the Secretary-General warned,

> "In order to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons in conflict zones, it is critical to establish more stringent control over small arms and ammunition and to put in place more effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes" (A/60/825, para. 46).

That speaks to the scale of the challenge to be overcome, which demands that the international community and, in particular the Security Council, take a holistic and integrated approach to ensuring consistency in the collective action of the Organization.

With the adoption of increasingly complex resolutions, which are therefore becoming increasingly difficult to implement, we will never be able to emphasize enough the importance of better coordinating and pooling the work of all the components of the international community. In that regard, the establishment of the new Office of Counter-Terrorism is particularly important, with its five primary functions, including steering actions carried out through the various anti-terrorism mandates delivered by the General Assembly and reinforcing the coordination and consistency of the activities of the 38 United Nations bodies and external entities that constitute the special team to combat terrorism, which is responsible for the balanced implementation of the four pillars of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

In conclusion, the Senegalese delegation would like to draw members' attention to the importance of constructively disseminating and making accessible what is required in the fight against terrorism through the holding of seminars and regional workshops that provide information and training for the benefit of Member States, in particular the most disadvantaged Member States, namely, a manual of best practices on support and guidance for victims of terrorism. The series of regional meetings that the important Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), currently chaired most ably by Bolivia, has continued to hold worldwide is also focused on such awareness-raising and training.

To conclude, my delegation would like, once again, to state that further efforts are necessary to finalize the drawing up and adoption of an international convention on counter-terrorism. The draft of that convention has been negotiated for decades within the United Nations, and its adoption is due.

Mr. Rosselli (Uruguay) (*spoke in Spanish*): At the outset, let me express my congratulations to Egypt for assuming the presidency of the Council for the month of August. At the same time, we would like to thank the Chinese delegation for its excellent stewardship of the Council during the month of July. We also would like to extend our welcome to the new Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation, Ambassador Vassily Nebenzya.

We appreciate the briefings delivered by today's distinguished briefers. We also thank the delegation of Egypt for the negotiation of the text of resolution 2370 (2017), which we adopted today. The resolution is of great relevance, because of the serious threat to international peace and security posed by the acquisition and use of weapons by terrorist groups and their links to transnational crime.

We understand that it is the primary responsibility of States to adopt national standards aimed at strengthening controls over the possession and use of arms, as well as at controlling their export, import and transit, so as to prevent and combat illicit trafficking. We also consider that there is a shared responsibility on the part of all States to deal with such a global problem, whose resolution necessitates that we all cooperate.

The development of national, bilateral, regional and international strategies forms an essential element in such necessary collective work. However, there is also a differentiated responsibility of States, since the very root of the problem lies in the production of and trade in arms. Consequently, the first responsibility lies with the States that carry out such activities. In that regard, I think it is worth remembering what the Uruguayan Foreign Minister, Rodolfo Nin Novoa, expressed on 25 May in his address to the Council, which recalled that the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute had pointed out that the five permanent members of the Security Council provided 75 per cent of the volume of total arms exports from 2011 to 2015 (see S/PV.7951).

As we have said on other occasions, Uruguay is a country committed to the fight against terrorism and disarmament. Uruguay is a party to 16 international instruments against terrorism and has signed and ratified existing regional and international treaties on disarmament and non-proliferation. At the national level, Uruguay has a law on the possession and marketing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives and other related materials. Among other things, that law refers to the international trafficking in such weapons. It criminalizes trade in those arms from or through Uruguay's national territory to any other State without obtaining the prior authorization of all the States concerned.

At the sub-regional level, within the Common Southern Market (MERCOSUR), there are legal instruments in that domain, as well as a working group on firearms. The members of MERCOSUR and associated States participate in that group. Its objectives include establishing convergent regional security policies in order to facilitate information exchange and cooperation.

At the regional level, the Organization of American States has also adopted key documents, such as the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials, the Bogota Declaration and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean.

At the international level, Uruguay is a party to the Arms Trade Treaty, which is currently the main instrument for the international regulation of the arms trade. For the sake of universalization, all States should accede to the Treaty. We also recognize the importance of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.

The problem of illicit trafficking in arms and their acquisition by terrorist groups and members of organized crime requires collective approaches and efforts. To that end, international cooperation and the provision of assistance should be strengthened, with special emphasis on building national capacities. Without those elements, the complex links between illicit trafficking in arms, terrorists and other transnational criminals can hardly be dismantled. It is necessary to increase cooperation among States in order to identify the routes and mechanisms of the circulation of arms, as well as to strengthen border controls. Uruguay reaffirms its commitment and cooperation in that task.

Mr. Kawamura (Japan): First of all, I would like to congratulate the Egyptian delegation for assuming the presidency of the Council for the month of August. We would also like to thank China for its excellent stewardship of the Council throughout July. We also would like to extend our welcome to the new Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation, Ambassador Vassily Nebenzya. Japan looks forward to working with him.

We are witnessing an ever larger number of terrorist attacks around the world. Access to weapons increases the number of civilian casualties. Resolution 2370 (2017), which we have adopted today, calls upon Member States to enhance measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons. As the resolution prescribes, it is

important not only to strengthen our own capabilities, but also to support efforts in other countries.

Allow me to provide a few examples that may be useful. Japan has been supporting capacity-building in Asia, as well as in the Middle East and Africa. We are working with the World Customs Organization (WCO), the International Criminal Police Organization, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and other organizations to help South and South-East Asia enhance their ability to counter improvised explosive devices (IEDs), as well as small arms and light weapons. In March, Japan provided $3.5 million to the WCO to help customs authorities in South and South-East Asia, as well as the Pacific Islands. Those funds will help them, at their land and sea borders, strengthen their investigative capabilities against the illicit trafficking in precursors to IEDs. We have also provided $1.5 million to prevent the illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons through air cargo and postal services. In relation to today's resolution, we emphasize that the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which seeks to counter the illicit trade in conventional arms, provides an effective means of preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons. Japan was one of the co-authors of the resolution that led to the establishment of the ATT (General Assembly resolution 67/234B). We believe strongly in its implementation and universalization. While the ATT was not incorporated in today's Council resolution, we call upon countries who have not yet done so, particularly major arms-trade States, to ratify the ATT as soon as possible.

Mr. Delattre (France) (*spoke in French*): First of all, allow me to extend our welcome to the new Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation, Ambassador Vassily Nebenzya. We would also like to thank China for the remarkable way in which it conducted itself during its presidency of the Council in July. I would also like to thank Egypt for assuming the presidency for the month of August. We thank Egypt for having organized today's important meeting and for having taken the initiative to put forth resolution 2370 (2017), which tries to tackle the problem of preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons. Lastly, I would also like to thank the representatives of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, the Office of Counter-Terrorism, INTERPOL and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime for their informative briefings.

Current events constantly remind us of the urgency and severity of the problem of the illicit arms trade, which, besides constituting a serious threat to international peace and security, fuels terrorist groups and provides them with the means to act that they need. France has had to confront it directly in the form of the terrorist attacks that have been occurred on its territory in the past few years, several of which were committed with small arms obtained through illicit transnational trade, and many other countries have been similarly affected. Beyond that, we are dealing with threats to the stability and development of many entire regions — the Sahel and the Middle East, to mention only two — as well as the viability of national reconciliation processes and people's full exercise of their human rights.

There are two types of such materials that have turned out to be particularly sensitive because they are well suited to the commission of terrorist acts — small arms and light weapons and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Resolution 2370 (2017), which we have just adopted unanimously, emphasizes them. France is taking special action regarding these weapons at various levels. The first is in the framework of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, whose third Review Conference, which France will chair, will be held in New York in 2018. The Programme of Action is an appropriate framework for guiding our collective action that has already resulted in significant progress whereby many States have improved their small-arms legislation, assistance programmes have been established and regional organizations are taking better account of the problem. Despite those advances, however, many challenges remain. The Review Conference will provide an essential opportunity for making concrete progress in the fight against the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, including by ramping up the mobilization of all stakeholders in the security, arms control and development sectors, and by exploiting all the potential synergies between existing instruments.

We are also working within the framework of the Arms Trade Treaty to improve regulation of the legitimate arms trade, and also through the Palermo Convention — under which France has begun its process of acceding to the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition — as well as

through the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Union and bilateral cooperation. With regard to IEDs in particular, France has also been very active in the General Assembly and in the context of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, as well as through bilateral cooperation.

It is in the interests of all States Members of the United Nations to promote comprehensive mobilization on the political and administrative fronts, and of all civil-society stakeholders, with a view to combating the spread of small arms and light weapons in as many States as possible. That commitment is essential if we are to do as much as we can to prevent terrorist groups and individuals from acquiring the means for violent action. We should work on a number of different kinds of action on trafficking, both upstream of it — in order to prevent the distribution of weapons in the first place — and downstream, so as to interrupt existing flows. Such measures include developing adequate national legislation, reducing illicit stocks in circulation through collection and destruction campaigns, improving the security and physical management of arms and ammunition stocks and strengthening police and customs controls. Importantly, resolution 2370 (2017) encourages States to redouble their efforts in this area. At the international level, it is crucial to ensure that countries accede to and ratify the principal related international instruments, and France urges all countries to accede to the Arms Trade Treaty as soon as possible.

I would like to conclude, Mr. President, by thanking you once again for giving us the opportunity to have this enriching and complex exchange on an issue that is a big priority for my country. France will continue to play its full part in the international community's efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring their means of attack. That means, among other things, that we must continue to be absolutely determined in the fight against every kind of traffic that is fueling terrorist groups, whether in weapons, narcotics or human beings.

The President (*spoke in Arabic*): There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers.

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.

United Nations S/PV.8018

Security Council

Seventy-second year

Provisional

8018th meeting
Thursday, 3 August 2017, 10 a.m.
New York

President:	Mr. Aboulatta	(Egypt)
Members:	Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	Mr. Llorentty Soliz
	China	Mr. Liu Jieyi
	Ethiopia	Mr. Alemu
	France	Mr. Delattre
	Italy	Mr. Lambertini
	Japan	Mr. Bessho
	Kazakhstan	Mr. Sadykov
	Russian Federation	Mr. Nebenzia
	Senegal	Mr. Ciss
	Sweden	Mr. Skau
	Ukraine	Mr. Vitrenko
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Mr. Rycroft
	United States of America	Ms. Sison
	Uruguay	Mr. Rosselli

Agenda

General issues relating to sanctions

Enhancing the effectiveness of United Nations sanctions

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The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

General issues relating to sanctions

Enhancing the effectiveness of United Nations sanctions

The President (*spoke in Arabic*): In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite Mr. Tayé-Brook Zerihoun, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, to participate in this meeting.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.

I give the floor to Mr. Zerihoun.

Mr. Zerihoun: I thank you, Mr. President for the opportunity to address the Security Council on issues related to United Nations sanctions.

This Security Council discussion on sanctions is set against a backdrop of wide-ranging and sustained challenges to international peace and security. New crises are straining the collective capacity to respond, while older conflicts are simmering, without resolution and with the potential to reignite. It seems timely, therefore, to take stock of the efficacy of United Nations sanctions, as was recently done for peace operations, peacebuilding and the women peace and security agenda.

Just as the causes of conflicts are complex and interlinked, the responses must be effective, complementary and mutually reinforcing. Sanctions are not an end in themselves. At their most effective, sanctions should contribute to a comprehensive political strategy, working in tandem with other Charter-based instruments, to prevent and peacefully resolve conflicts.

Today, 13 Security Council sanctions regimes play an enabling role in preventing conflict, countering terrorism and constraining the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Council has adopted tailored and calibrated sanctions measures to deter unconstitutional change of government; the illicit exploitation of natural resources, which funds the activities of armed groups; as well as violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, in particular sexual violence in conflict as an act of terror. Conversely, sanctions measures have been adopted to support the implementation of peace agreements and peacebuilding efforts. The Council's sanctions regimes on the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant/Da'esh and Al-Qaida, as well as the regime under resolution 1718 (2006), on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, are central to international efforts to tackle terrorism and proliferation, respectively. Both have been continually adjusted to meet specific and evolving challenges, with due regard to the impact on civilian populations.

Security Council sanctions are also a flexible instrument, subject to regular reviews, adjustments and terminations. In 2016, three sanctions regimes — those concerning Iran, Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia — were terminated. While the Council has adopted 26 sanctions regimes since 1966, it has also terminated 15 regimes to date. That invalidates the often-heard criticism that the Council establishes but does not terminate its sanctions regimes.

In its commitment to continually reviewing its sanctions regimes, the Council has also requested the Secretary-General to take stock of various elements of sanctions regimes. Since 2014, the Secretary-General has provided assessments to the Council on the arms embargoes in Somalia and the Central African Republic, as well as on the sanctions regimes in Liberia and Guinea-Bissau. In his next report to the Security Council on small arms and light weapons, the Secretary-General will provide lessons learned on the implementation of arms embargoes in field missions.

Reviews of sanctions regimes have also resulted in strengthening responses to growing threats. Last year, the Council adopted resolutions 2270 (2016) and 2321 (2016), which considerably strengthened the existing sanctions regime on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In Libya, the Council expanded the prohibitions on the export of petroleum products and designation criteria were adopted this year for acts of sexual violence in the Central African Republic, as well as in the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant/Da'esh and Al-Qaida sanctions regime. Moreover, the Council has combined the robust enforcement of sanctions with due respect for human rights through the Focal Point for Delisting in the Secretariat and the Office of the Ombudsperson for the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant/Da'esh and Al-Qaida sanctions regime. Over the past decade, the Council has made important strides in its due process commitments when imposing targeted sanctions on individuals and entities.

Effective United Nations sanctions require the broad-based support of Member States and the international community at large. Even the best designed United Nations sanctions resolutions are not self-implementing. Member States still need to fulfil their implementation obligations. While there may have been different assessments of the implementation gap of United Nations sanctions, it is undeniable that the diversity and complexity of targeted United Nations sanctions regimes have imposed a considerable burden of implementation on Member States and other implementing entities.

In order to mitigate those difficulties, the Security Council and its sanctions committees have enhanced outreach to Member States, especially to regional countries affected by sanctions. Sanctions committees routinely meet with regional countries to discuss implementation challenges. Chairs of sanctions committees have also held open briefings, including for regional groups, in order to promote awareness of Council sanctions regimes. Those are supplemented with the travel of committee Chairs to countries and regions impacted by sanctions. That allows for the accrual of first-hand understanding of the effectiveness of sanctions measures.

Furthermore, all Security Council sanctions lists have been made available in the six official United Nations languages, with linkages to Security Council-INTERPOL Special Notices, where available. The Secretariat has also been working on the implementation of an enhanced data model of United Nations sanctions lists in order to deepen the information base, which will allow for more accurate screening of individuals and entities by relevant national and international authorities.

While those are all useful means to enhance the application of sanctions, the implementation of United Nations sanctions is necessarily a whole-of-Government endeavour. Member States would benefit from even greater in-country assistance. Sanctions are adopted in New York, but they are mainly implemented at border crossings, ports and airports, as well as in banking and financial institutions, bringing together a multitude of Government institutions at various levels, as well as the private sector. Beyond Member States, the positive experience of Council's partnership with INTERPOL, especially through the use of the Special Notices, should be applied to other important partnerships, especially the aviation and financial sectors.

All previous State-led reviews of United Nations sanctions have stressed the importance of coordinated United Nations system-wide support to sanctions regimes. Since 2014, under the leadership of the Department of Political Affairs, the United Nations Inter-Agency Working Group on Sanctions, which is comprised of 26 United Nations entities, has continued its work to ensure system-wide support to United Nations sanctions. The Working Group is an important forum for promoting better understanding of United Nations sanctions regimes, facilitating the preparation of sanctions assessment reports, and promoting productive interactions among United Nations entities, sanctions committees and sanctions experts.

The Department of Political Affairs, through its Security Council Affairs Division (SCAD), has also continued its support to the Security Council in the design, implementation and evaluation of United Nations sanctions. In recent years, SCAD has further enhanced its support to the Council, sanctions committees and their experts on substantive, procedural and technical issues. Sanctions workshops and regime-specific briefings were organized for incoming members of the Council in order to explain working methods and procedural issues, as well as the substantive aspects of each sanctions regime. Furthermore, advisory support was also provided to Member States in order to facilitate the implementation of United Nations sanctions regimes, in particular regarding exemption requests and implementation reports.

The Security Council Affairs Division also plays a key role in supporting and managing the nine sanctions monitoring groups, teams and panels, which are comprised of 59 sanctions experts. Since 2013, the Division has organized an annual inter-panel workshop for all sanctions experts. Since 2015, it has organized an investigative techniques workshop for relevant experts, in partnership with the United Nations Office for Internal Oversight and Audit.

The importance of our support to sanctions experts was, tragically, brought into sharp focus with the killings in March of Ms. Zaida Catalán and Mr. Michael Sharp, members of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Even as we continue to press for full accountability for those abhorrent crimes, we need to also reassess the security arrangements that govern the work of sanctions experts in order to ensure that such crimes never happen again. In that regard, the findings and recommendations of the board of inquiry

will be instructive. We look forward to the support of the Security Council in the implementation of the necessary changes that may be required.

United Nations sanctions are a formidable instrument for global peace and security. It is important that they continue to be deployed in tandem with other Charter-based instruments in the service of clearly established objectives, and with respect for due process and human rights.

The President (*spoke in Arabic*): I thank Mr. Zerihoun for his briefing.

I now give the floor to the members of the Security Council.

Mr. Rycroft (United Kingdom): I thank Assistant Secretary-General Zerihoun for his briefing, which has made clear that sanctions are a vital part of the Security Council's arsenal. As Article 41 of the United Nations Charter makes clear, they give real effect to our decisions, turning words spoken in this Chamber into tangible actions against those who threaten international peace and security.

They are not our first resort, nor are they a measure that we can ever take lightly, but we know that sanctions work. They helped bring peace and security to countries like Liberia and Sierra Leone. They helped bring Iran to the negotiating table, which led in turn to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. And sanctions continue to play a vital role in the fight against Da'esh and Al-Qaida in Iraq, Syria and beyond. All of these examples illustrate not just the efficacy of sanctions but the importance of using them together with the other tools at our disposal.

The Iran deal was not forged from sanctions alone. Our victory over Da'esh will not be secured through the hard work of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, alone. Sanctions must sit alongside all our other tools: direct political dialogue, mediation, peacekeeping and special political missions. And just as with all other tools of the Council, it is important that sanctions remain fit for purpose.

So I want to thank you, Mr. President, for bringing this issue before the Council again so that we can consider if there are further ways to improve our collective work on sanctions. All future work on sanctions should build on the great deal of valuable work that has already been carried out by States and stakeholders on this issue. In particular, I want to highlight both the work of the United Nations informal working group from 2006 and also the high-level review of United Nations sanctions led by Sweden and other sponsors. They have produced good recommendations.

But as we all know, building the political commitment required for effective follow-up has been challenging. This issue of political will applies above all when it comes to the serious implementation of sanctions. For such measures to be truly effective, it is absolutely essential that all States implement them fully. It is not good enough just for the majority of countries to do so. A chain is only as strong as its weakest link.

All Member States must recognize and respect the fact that there can be no ifs, no buts: sanctions agreed in the Council are legally binding Chapter VII obligations. I recognize that even when there is strong political will, implementation can be challenging, not just for States but also for businesses. There is already much good work in this area: outreach from sanctions committees, the development of networks and capacity-building, the sharing of information and best practices among States. But a great deal more can still be done, especially on the most important of sanctions dossiers, such as North Korea, where the number of States reporting on implementation still falls far short of what it needs to be.

That is why, Mr. President, we welcome further consideration of your delegation's recent suggestion for a Secretary-General's report on cross-cutting issues related to sanctions. If this report builds on the existing work I have referred to, draws lessons from current sanctions regimes and offers concrete practical suggestions on how to improve implementation and effectiveness, then we think that this could be a valuable addition to our sanctions work, one that will help set a clear agenda for further improvements, building on the high-level review and other efforts.

There is, quite simply, no clearer reminder of the need to strengthen our sanctions capability that the current situation that we confront in relation to North Korea. Here we face a State that continues to act in flagrant violation of multiple Security Council resolutions, a State that continues to threaten not just its region but the whole world in its reckless pursuit of nuclear weapons and illegal missiles. Their latest ICBM launch last week suggests a capability that puts

most Security Council members, including the United Kingdom, within range.

I have said before in this Chamber, but it bears repeating today, that we as the Security Council must act and must be prepared to use sanctions to raise the cost to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of pursuing these illegal actions.

Mr. Sadykov (Kazakhstan): At the outset, let me thank Egypt for having organized this timely meeting on sanctions, which are an important tool under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The Security Council has a long-standing history and practice of applying sanctions. However, several key issues need to be considered to make sanctions relevant, such as the best means of increasing their effectiveness by making them more carefully targeted; ensuring their worldwide implementation in the most efficient and balanced way; averting negative socioeconomic and humanitarian consequences for innocent populations and third States; and preventing double standards in their application.

Kazakhstan supports the need for Security Council sanctions mechanisms and the implementation of Council sanctions that are important preventive measures and help sustain or restore international peace and security. In accordance with Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the use of sanctions, and the subsequent use of force, should be undertaken with caution. They must not be seen as an early response but rather as a last resort, after all preventive and diplomatic means have been exhausted.

Sanctions should be designed to modify behaviour. Wherever possible, they must be subject to a pre-assessment on the probable impact of the proposed sanctions from a humanitarian point of view, as well as enforcement and efficacy. Equally crucial is the need for monitoring and regular review, taking full account of collateral effects. Bodies imposing or supervising sanctions must ensure the maximum possible transparency and accountability, accompanied by improved working methods and processes. Correspondingly, Secretariat budgeting and staffing on sanctions needs to be strengthened so as to bring about substantial improvement in means of sanctions enforcement.

We join others in their recommendation that the ad hoc Informal Working Group on General Issues of Sanctions should be strengthened. My delegation welcomes the restructuring of the Security Council Affairs Division team so as to meet the needs of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011). We hope that this process will be concluded soon in order to reinforce technical and administrative support for the Monitoring Team and thus fulfil that high-profile mandate in a challenging security and political environment. Every sanction regime is unique and carefully tailored to address specific, clear objectives. However, there is always room for improvement, such as disseminating the best practices of various committees so as to enhance the overall effectiveness of United Nations sanctions regimes. These also can be enhanced by greater cooperation and information-sharing.

Throughout the sanctions phase, every effort should be made to continue with diplomacy and mediation so as to ensure that Member States comply with Security Council resolutions. Sanctions should have clear, precisely defined objectives and termination criteria, and, when these have been met, they should be lifted. It is important for the Security Council sanctions committees to closely cooperate and engage in dialogue with the Member States affected and raise their awareness regarding the reasons for and the objectives and nature of the sanctions measures undertaken.

Lack of awareness and absence of a relationship with the affected Member States could potentially erode the credibility of United Nations sanctions and result in a reluctance to implement them. We also call for close interaction among all interested Member States so as to influence those States and bring about regional global compliance.

Just as vital is timely information management and sharing among the Council, Member States, regional or subregional bodies and technical bodies, including INTERPOL, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Air Transport Association, the World Customs Organization and the Financial Action Task Force, with the aim of monitoring covert illegal operations. The role of the private sector is critical to uphold norms so that some entities do not become illegal trading or export or import partners

with countries under sanctions regimes. We also call for greater vigilance by chambers of commerce working as key partners with all actors involved in this complex and wide-ranging stakeholder arrangement.

Capacity-building for Member States that are at various stages of the economic continuum is necessary. States must be helped to understand and upgrade their legal procedures and enact new domestic legislation in keeping with United Nations standards. Similarly, assistance in technical guidance and the provision of equipment and scientific tools are necessary to detect the inflow and outflow of money and goods that constitute sanctions violations.

To conclude, Kazakhstan, as the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) concerning Al Qa'ida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities, the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) and the Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea will strive, as part of the larger multilateral effort, to enhance United Nations sanctions regimes as tools for promoting regional and global peace and security.

Mr. Liu Jieyi (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): I thank Egypt for having its initiative to convene today's meeting. I would like to thank Assistant Secretary-General Zerihoun for his briefing.

Under the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, sanctions measures, as one of the peaceful means of conflict resolution, play a positive role in maintaining international peace and security. Over the years, the Security Council has established multiple sanctions regimes to address conflict situations. Some of those regimes have served their purpose and have been lifted. At the same time, some sanctions regimes have problems and require careful consideration by the Security Council in order to improve them effectively. We must pay particular attention to the following aspects.

First, the use of sanctions by the Security Council must be in full keeping with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. There must be prudence and responsibility when employing sanctions. As a matter of priority, the Security Council should use non-coercive means, such as negotiations, mediation and good offices to respond to the threats to international peace and security. The imposition of sanctions should be predicated upon the exhaustion of non-coercive means. Sanctions are peaceful means and should therefore be implemented in a peaceful manner, rather than being imposed through the use of force.

Secondly, the Security Council's decision to impose sanctions must be part of an overall political settlement package. Sanctions are not the end in themselves. Sanctions alone cannot resolve issues. The fundamental way out is through the use of political and diplomatic means, such as dialogue and negotiation. In quite a few cases, the weak link in the solution lies not with the level of sanctions implementation, but rather with the lack of progress in the political track. The Security Council's decision on the overall political package should be advanced holistically. The implementation of Security Council resolutions should not be selective. The use of sanctions measures by the Security Council should serve the overall purpose of the political process. It should be conducive to the mediation and good offices efforts by the relevant countries, regional organizations and the United Nations, thereby truly helping to ease the situation on the ground and reach solutions.

Thirdly, the Security Council should enhance the relevance of sanctions in order to avoid negative consequences. The Council should determinedly focus on the key aspects of issues at hand and be prudent when considering the measures and scope of sanctions. Sanctions should serve the purpose of conflict resolution. To the greatest extent possible, sanctions measures should have a low negative impact on the general population and third countries. In addition, sanctions measures should not affect the normal legal trade and economic relations of the sanctioned countries nor people's livelihoods and the humanitarian situation in the countries concerned. As the situation on the ground and the resolution process evolve, the Security Council should conduct timely evaluations and assessments of the sanctions measures and, as needed, adjust, suspend and, ultimately, terminate them.

Imposing sanctions is a very important decision. It should be done properly and strictly in line with decisions taken by the Security Council so as to avoid any attempt outside the framework of the Security Council to impose unilateral sanctions or wilfully expand their scope. As a permanent member of the Security Council, China will continue to maintain its prudent and responsible approach in addressing the issue of sanctions so as to ensure that the sanctions measures decided by the Security Council will serve the ultimate purpose of the political process and be

subject to it, in order for it to play its part in maintaining international peace and security in a constructive and positive manner.

Mr. Alemu (Ethiopia): We express appreciation to the Egyptian presidency for organizing today's briefing on enhancing the effectiveness of sanctions, building on the Arria-formula meeting held last month.

We thank the Assistant Secretary-General, Mr. Tayé-Brook Zerihoun, for his very useful briefing.

As defined in the Charter of the United Nations and as colleagues have indicated, sanctions are one of the important tools at the disposal of the Security Council for the promotion and maintenance of international peace and security. As Assistant Secretary-General Zerihoun stated and as is also self-evident, sanctions are not an end in themselves. They are and should be part of a broader political strategy, aimed at preventing, managing and resolving conflicts. Without them, they cannot achieve the desired results.

We recognize that sanctions have evolved significantly over time. The way that the Security Council uses sanctions has changed from its earlier practice of imposing comprehensive sanctions to its contemporary practice of applying targeted measures. That is an important development, which would make the sanctions regime more effective and, most importantly, provide a mechanism to address the unintended and adverse effects of comprehensive sanctions. If used appropriately and in a targeted manner, we believe that sanctions have the potential to exert pressure on specific individuals or entities whose behaviour the Council is seeking to influence.

We understand that important work has been done in the past to review the efficacy of sanctions, following the Council's willingness, as shown in practice, to make use of targeted sanctions more often and apply them to a broader range of activities and more diverse kinds of threats to international peace and security. We thank the presidency for taking up this subject matter and its effort to build on this important work. We agree that sanctions should be carefully designed and implemented to include clear objectives, as well as a defined scope and to periodically review the progress made against their objectives. More often than not, discussions tend to be polarized with arguments in favour of or against the application of sanctions in general terms. We do not believe that that will help to make progress in enhancing the effectiveness of sanctions.

In our opinion, perhaps a better approach to achieving the desired objective would be to look at the merit of each case and its specific context. We recognize that sanctions are not meant to stay in place forever. If the situation warrants the modification or lifting of a sanction, the Council should not hesitate to take appropriate measures accordingly. However, specific situations may also require that sanctions be strengthened, and the Council should not shy away from that. Assistant Secretary-General Zerihoun mentioned instances where that has happened. What really matters is the reality on the ground, and the importance of ensuring that the Council uses its tools effectively so as to induce changes in behaviour. That underscores the need for realism and pragmatism in dealing with various situations. We are opposed to politicizing sanctions and allowing double standards in their design and implementation. Nonetheless, we do not think that that should lead us to reject the use of sanctions as a tool. Rather, we should avoid politicization and double standards and apply sanctions judiciously, when appropriate, and based on the merits of the case. Moreover, the Council and Member States' level of enthusiasm and determination for implementing sanctions should not differ from one sanction regime to another. That is another reason why we should continually review the way the Council uses and implements this tool, and draw valuable lessons for improving sanctions' application and implementation.

Lastly, the important role that regional and subregional organizations play in improving the design and effective implementation of sanctions regimes cannot be overlooked. Coordinating efforts with regional and subregional organizations and mechanisms is very important for the effectiveness of sanctions regimes. If we look at the Constitutive Act of the African Union, it has a much more progressive stance on the issue, and it is one reason why we urge the Council to further enhance its cooperation with regional and subregional organizations, including on the issue under discussion.

Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): We are grateful to the Egyptian delegation for organizing today's meeting and for the briefing by Mr. Zerihoun, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs.

Sanctions are one of the most important instruments in the Security Council's toolbox. However, political practice has shown that restrictive measures cannot be an end in themselves. Their job is to assist in the

achievement of political and diplomatic solutions to conflict situations, and the Council alone has the right to impose and use them in support of the clear and legitimate goals that are enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

We recognize the importance of improving sanctions. We believe they should be limited in duration, subject to regular review and have clear criteria for being phased out. It is important to ensure that they focus on those who are genuinely responsible for instigating crises. They should not harm civilians or socioeconomic development, which is why it is essential to study the situation carefully before introducing them. Using restrictive measures to overthrow objectionable regimes, including through economic strangulation or by influencing their circumstances, is unacceptable. We believe that the wilful interpretation of sanctions decisions is illegitimate. Experience has shown that it is liable to increase chaos and worsen civilian populations' suffering. It is also important to ensure that sanctions texts do not depart from generally recognized international legal standards. Sanctions should never be wielded as a club against diplomatic and consular representatives, whose activities have been seriously complicated by expanded interpretations of existing restrictions, constituting a violation of the Vienna Conventions.

With regard to the work of the Security Council Sanctions Committees, I would like to emphasize that any infringement on their prerogatives should not tolerated. In particular, we see no need for duplicating their powers by adding bureaucratic superstructures, including working groups. Every sanctions regime is individual and unique by definition, and what is useful for some issues can be counterproductive for others. It is important to emphasize that as an intergovernmental organization, the United Nations should reserve the prerogative of decision-making for Member States. In that context, we are wary of the idea of introducing supporters of stakeholders into the decision-making chain. It is no secret that they may be fronting for influence groups interested in a particular outcome, not to mention the fact that most of the Sanctions Committees have their own monitoring groups providing independent evaluations and recommendations. It is regrettable that the use of unilateral restrictions, often on top of Security Council decisions, is becoming the norm today. That frequently implies unfair economic competition. Such policies undermine political and diplomatic efforts to resolve crises, run counter to efforts to strengthen international cooperation, violate States' sovereignty and legitimate interests and have nothing to do with the concerns of a global Organization.

We are ready to continue constructive discussion of the issue of improving sanctions mechanisms. In that context, we believe it would be useful to return to the results of the Council's Informal Working Group on General Issues of Sanctions. Its achievements, including a final report (S/2006/997), made a significant contribution to improving the effectiveness of the work of the relevant Committees. Many of them could be adapted to current realities.

Mr. Vitrenko (Ukraine): I would like to thank the Egyptian presidency for organizing today's meeting and Assistant Secretary- General Zerihoun for his thorough briefing.

For more than 50 years now, the prohibitions and restrictions imposed by the Security Council have been recognized as the most powerful non-military response to threats to global peace and security that we have. We share the view that sanctions continue to be an important tool for countering terrorism, preventing conflicts, consolidating peace agreements, protecting civilians and curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, the current practice of introducing more precise and targeted sanctions is aimed at striking a balance between the desired result and any possible unintended or adverse socioeconomic and humanitarian consequences in specific States or third States. Significant progress has also been made in designing and monitoring the implementation of sanctions regimes since April 2000, when the Council's Informal Working Group on General Issues of Sanctions was first established. Another successful step has been the establishment of expert panels to assist the relevant Security Council Committees, while the introduction of an entirely new institution — the Office of the Ombudsperson of the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities — is a notable leap forward in ensuring that sanctions meet human rights standards.

The processes of designing, implementing, evaluating and following up sanctions, as well as of the relevant Committees' working methods, monitoring

and enforcement, are closely interlinked and mutually reinforcing. At the same time, we have to recognize that the Council's sustained attention is needed not only for developments in the design of sanctions and calibration of their nature and scope, but also for the issue of enhancing their effectiveness and efficiency. That clearly depends largely on Member States' prompt, comprehensive implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions.

We see two major challenges in making United Nations sanctions more efficient. The first — and here we echo the comments of the delegation of the United Kingdom — is a lack of political will, which prevents the Council from responding promptly and decisively to grave violations of international law. The second is outright obstruction or evasion of existing sanctions. While the lack of political will and abuses of the right to the veto should be the subject of a separate debate, I would like to recall that paragraph 5 of Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations states, among other things, that Member States shall refrain from giving assistance to any State against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action. In that respect, Security Council should explore ways to further strengthen the roles of the respective Committees in identifying possible cases of non-compliance and determining the appropriate course of action with regard to those who violate the relevant international obligations.

Outreach activities, including awareness-raising and dialogue with the relevant international and regional organizations, as well as the effective means of enforcing sanctions, are seen as important elements in curbing, eliminating and further preventing sanctions' evasion. At the same time, assistance to States in implementing United Nations sanctions is an area in which, in our view, more can and should be done to increase the effect of decisions made by the Council.

Let me also stress in that connection the important role played by various international organizations in implementing sanction regimes to respond to breaches of peace and other grave violations of international law. The use of additional measures and their own specific instruments for better targeting international wrongdoing is an essential part of the international toolbox in that area. The efforts of the European Union should be seen as an example of a consistent and coherent sanctions policy firmly rooted in international law.

Ukraine is among those countries that fully recognize the importance of undertaking continuous efforts, including periodic reviews, to further improve the proper design, implementation, evaluation and follow-up of sanctions regimes and to increase the effectiveness of targeted sanctions. To that end, we are in favour of further endeavours, including relevant reports of the Secretary-General, aimed at the independent review of cross-cutting issues and trends in the application of sanctions and the best practices and challenges relating to their implementation, as well as preparing recommendations, including with regard to practical options to better support Member States' capacities in that area.

I should like to conclude by citing Jan Eliasson:

> "[S]anctions can work — when they are designed and implemented well and when they enjoy the support of Member States on and outside the Security Council." (*DSG/SM/777*)

Mr. Llorentty Solíz (Bolivia) (*spoke in Spanish*): Bolivia expresses its appreciation for the briefing given by Mr. Tayé-Brook Zerihoun, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs. My delegation also welcomes the initiative of Egypt in organizing today's informative meeting, highlighting a very important and sensitive issue that affects the maintenance of international peace and security.

Our Organization is based on the values of multilateralism, and it is precisely through those values that the United Nations, as a multilateral system, depends on the legitimacy and international legality that allow it to address global problems and conflicts and, at the same time, to respond to threats to international peace and security through, inter alia, the imposition of sanctions. Under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, sanctions must be considered only when all other means of peacefully settling disputes set forth in Chapter VI of the Charter have been exhausted and only after their short-term and long-term effects have been evaluated in detail. In that vein, sanctions must not be an end in themselves. They must be used as a measure of last resort in the event of a breach of the provisional measures established under the Charter, and must be imposed only when there is a clear threat to international peace and security, the breach thereof or an impending act of aggression.

Currently, we are witnessing a dangerous trend towards the proliferation of the application and

imposition of unilateral sanctions. The Plurinational State of Bolivia categorically rejects the implementation of such measures because they represent a flagrant violation of multilateralism and a serious threat to the international order, and constitute illegal measures that impose the jurisdiction and internal legislation of one State over another, thereby violating the principles of equality, sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the States. Such actions are not only illegal — constituting, as I said, an imposition of one State's domestic law on another's and upon the international order — but also constitute actions that usurp the functions of legal bodies, such as the Security Council, which is the only international legal body that can impose sanctions on States and non-State actors within the framework of the Charter. Accordingly, we reiterate that any measure adopted unilaterally by one State to the detriment of another through the use of force or any other coercive measures is outside the framework of the Security Council and therefore illegal and contrary to the principles and purposes of the Charter.

We believe that, when the imposition of sanctions is to be considered, the right to due process and respect for international law must be taken into account, which, through official and reliable sources of information, helps to clearly establish the situation in a given national context that might represent a threat to international peace and security, while at all times observing the principle of the non-use of force and the peaceful settlement of disputes before resorting to measures that warrant the application of Chapter VII of the Charter. The design and development of sanctions must be governed by fair and transparent procedures that help to clearly identify the conditions demanded of States or parties upon which sanctions have been imposed, with a periodic review of those measures to assess their effects and modify them as needed with respect to developments.

We believe that the imposition of sanctions must not affect the development of States subject to such measures, and in all cases must be implemented with a view to minimizing the impact on and possible humanitarian cost for the civilian population affected by the implementation of such measures.

Those issues were addressed at the World Summit held during the sixtieth session of the General Assembly, on 24 October 2005, at which it was reiterated that sanctions must be selective and have clear goals, thereby ensuring that their implementation strikes a balance between their effectiveness in achieving the desired outcomes and their potentially negative consequences, including socioeconomic and humanitarian consequences involving the population and third States. That was in line with the final document of the seventeenth Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Non-Aligned Movement held in Isla Margarita in 2016, which states:

(*spoke in English*)

> "The objectives of sanctions are not to punish or otherwise exact retribution on the populace. In this regard, the objectives of sanctions regimes should be clearly defined, and that its imposition should be for a specified time frame and be based on tenable legal grounds, and that it should be lifted as soon as the objectives are achieved. The conditions demanded of the State or party on which sanctions are imposed should be clearly defined and subject to periodic review. Sanctions should be imposed only when there exists a threat to international peace and security or an act of aggression, in accordance with the Charter, and that it is not applicable "preventively" in instances of mere violation of international law, norms or standards. Targeted sanctions may be a better alternative so long as the population of targeted State concerned is not victimised whether directly or indirectly".

(*spoke in Spanish*)

Lastly, we believe that it is necessary to develop a process for evaluating the methodology, implementation, impact and modification of sanctions imposed by the Security Council, which must carry out that task so as to improve the desired results with the ultimate goal being, at all times, to ensure that international peace and security prevail. Bolivia supports the preparation by the Secretary-General of a report on the impact of sanctions, which should also cover the impact of unilateral sanctions on international law and international peace and security. We recall that the sanctions that the Security Council imposes are under no circumstances the foundation on which more sanctions can be added. Rather they constitute the ceiling or limit that is legally and legitimately agreed within the framework of the Charter.

Mr. Rosselli (Uruguay) (*spoke in Spanish*): I should also like to thank the Egyptian delegation for convening today's meeting, as well as the Assistant

Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Mr. Tayé-Brook Zerihoun, for his briefing today.

For Uruguay, it is important that the Security Council work to improve the effectiveness of United Nations sanctions. In that regard, the ongoing analysis of sanctions regimes is a necessary exercise of systemic importance aimed at reviewing the efficiency and the effectiveness of any tool that the Security Council has at its disposal for the maintenance of international peace and security. In that regard, we also recognize the value of the contributions that Member States often make, including the high-level review that was undertaken several years ago under the auspices of Germany, Australia, Finland, Greece and Sweden (see S/2015/432). That review was an important task that could be continued in order improve the design of Security Council sanctions regimes.

I would like to focus my statement on one fundamental area: the need for sanctions regimes to be effective, with effectiveness meaning the complete achievement of the goal of the sanctions. Each of the sanctions regimes should be conceived as a tool that allows the Security Council to achieve a goal. In order to be effective, that tool must complement other tools, such as mediation and dialogue. At the same time, I would like, on that point, to mention the importance of naming specific objectives when designing sanctions regimes, objectives that, once achieved, will serve as the basis for lifting those sanctions. Generally, the Council imposes sanctions without establishing the conditions under which they may be lifted. No specific goals are set out, and there is a lack of guarantees for those who are the object of the sanctions. In turn, individuals, entities or States subject to sanctions do not know if at any given time they can be absolved and, if that were to happen, under what conditions. Moreover, sanctions should be designed in such a way as to minimize the adverse effects on the civilian population. The periodic review and improvement of the initial design of sanctions regimes, for which specific commitments have been set out, are therefore crucial.

Secondly, Uruguay recognizes the suitability of a comprehensive sanctions review, similar to those conducted on the peacebuilding architecture, on peacekeeping operations, and on women and peace and security.

I wish to mention the importance of cooperation for the effective implementation of all sanctions-regime provisions. It would be useful for the information collected by a group of experts to be made available to other groups of experts, if they are considered to be of relevance. We would also point out the necessity of strengthening cooperation between the United Nations and other institutions, such as INTERPOL or the regional or international financial institutions.

It is also appropriate to highlight the importance of cooperation between States for the effective implementation of sanctions regimes. For that level of cooperation to be viable, two variables come into play: the capacities of States and their political will. Frequently, the effective implementation of sanctions regimes requires an infrastructure and logistical capacities that are often lacking in developing countries. That may include software, intelligence, data cross-referencing, cutting-edge technology, etc. That sort of lack directly affects the implementation of the provisions of the various sanctions regimes and undermines their legitimacy.

In conclusion, I wish to recall the importance of systematic political commitment to the correct implementation and design of sanctions regimes, which are always understood as a means or tool of the Security Council aimed at achieving an ultimate goal.

Mr. Delattre (France) (*spoke in French*): First of all, I should like to thank the Egyptian presidency of the Security Council for organizing this important meeting, as well as the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Mr. Tayé-Brook Zerihoun, for his very informative briefing.

With 13 active sanctions regimes, sanctions have become a crucial tool available to the Security Council. Although they are never an end in themselves, sanctions can be an essential instrument for preserving international peace and security in two ways.

The first is by targeting terrorist groups or individuals. Collectively, the sanctions regime against Al-Qaida and Da'esh represents more than half of the entities and individuals sanctioned by the Security Council today.

The second way is by intervening in support of States weakened by insecurity, the presence of armed groups in their territory, deficiencies in the political process, the prevalence of weapons, or human rights violations, factors that have triggered the majority of the Security Council sanctions regimes.

Sanctions regimes can make a significant contribution to advancing a political process. The adoption of targeted measures against individuals or entities impeding the peace process is an important lever for stopping such behaviour or for weakening those who do so. That was particularly the case in Côte d'Ivoire at the height of the post-election crisis there. In Somalia, the embargo on charcoal undermines one of Al-Shabaab's sources of funding. These are just a few examples.

Implemented in the 1990s, sometimes indiscriminately, sanctions regimes have since undergone considerable change, taking into account both the humanitarian needs and the rights of individuals. In its practice, the Council has ensured that such schemes have been targeted as precisely as possible to reach the persons, entities or sectors that directly affect the stability of States, and that such schemes have no negative consequences for the population. No one can say in good faith that, in a context of active armed conflict and large-scale violence against civilians, an arms embargo is a measure that would negatively affect the population.

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, it was possible to adapt the sanctions regime to changing circumstances. Introduced in 2003, the arms embargo there has been continually adjusted. Since 2008, it has only targeted non-State entities. Individual sanctions against armed groups have also had to be adapted to developments in the situation.

France also attaches great importance to strengthening respect for the rules for a fair hearing with regard to sanctions decided by the Council. Considerable progress has been made in that area, with the creation of a focal-point mechanism and, above all, the Office of the Ombudsperson in 2009. In that respect, France wishes to recall the importance of ensuring a rapid and effective transition following the departure of Ms. Marchi-Uhel, who is to take on other functions. It is essential that we continue to improve the functioning and transparency of sanctions regimes.

It is also essential that sanctions and embargoes, whether targeting arms or other products, be fully respected and implemented by all actors present in the territory to which they apply. There are often exemption mechanisms that provide flexibility for specific cases. It is necessary to remind and educate everyone of the need to respect the procedures laid down for that purpose.

France will, of course, continue to fully play its part in such efforts.

Mr. Ciss (Senegal) (*spoke in French*): My delegation would like to thank the Egyptian presidency for the opportunity to discuss a particularly important issue in the context of the maintenance of international peace and security.

The interest of the subject that brings us together today, namely, sanctions as measures decided on by the Security Council that do not involve the use of force, is that it highlights a central element of our collective action aimed at achieving our common goal of peace and security for all, as set out in the Charter of the United Nations, namely, the maintenance of international peace and security.

As highlighted by the High-level Review of United Nations Sanctions and the subsequent Compendium issued in June 2015 (S/2015/432), sanctions form an important tool for maintaining collective security and, as such, have been used with increasing regularity in order to deal with various increasingly complex threats to international peace and security, such as terrorism, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, violations of human rights and the illegal exploitation of natural resources.

It is, therefore, understandable that the design, implementation and scope of such measures should be the subject of a common understanding, mutual reinforcement and equal commitment by all the parties concerned, in particular all of the entities of the United Nations system. It is in that spirit that the 2005 World Summit Outcome recalls that we must

> "ensure that sanctions are implemented in ways that balance effectiveness to achieve the desired results against the possible adverse consequences, including socioeconomic and humanitarian consequences, for populations and third States." (General Assembly resolution 60/1, para.106)

It is now recognized that United Nations sanctions have evolved significantly over the years. They tend to be more clever, more intelligent and more adapted to the situations to which they apply. Experience has shown, however, that their effectiveness and positive contribution to the improvement of given situations depend to a large extent on the transparency and clarity of their purpose and the objectives that the sanctions hope to achieve, as well as on the adherence of the different parties. Additionally, the effectiveness of

sanctions depends especially on the consistency of the sanctions concerned with other measures or actions carried out by the United Nations with their partners, in particular regional and national partners, in response to the given problem or situation.

The issue of the effectiveness of sanctions can be approached from various angles — notably angles related to their legitimacy and their timeliness, the political will of the actors in charge of their application and their adaptation to specific situations and to the various methods of the Council or its various sanctions committees used to monitor the development and implementation of the regimes established. However, my delegation would like to highlight some aspects that we consider to be essential for the effectiveness and efficiency of sanctions regimes.

The challenge is, first and foremost, to address the challenge of consistency with other United Nations responses and actions, as advocated by the aforementioned High-level Review, which indicates that the integration of sanctions in other United Nations interventions is essential for identifying synergies, preventing incompatible actions and enhancing the overall effectiveness of the collective security system.

Given the increasing importance of the regional dimension in the system of collective peace and security, we believe that the second challenge is to place greater emphasis on the synergy of the efforts of regional, sub-regional and international actors with the policies and actions of the United Nations. Indeed, in most of the regimes in effect, cooperation between the sanctions committees and the countries in the region has proved to be an essential element of the effectiveness of the measures adopted.

Finally, we believe that in a context characterized by the growth of the Internet and digital technologies, coupled with the growing complexity of the financial environment — a context in which the free movement of people and goods is developing — capacity-building is a crucial dimension of international cooperation. The level of the capacities of the countries and institutions involved in the implementation of sanctions is decisive, if one bears in mind that most sanctions regimes relate to developing countries.

It is therefore important to pay particular attention to those developing countries that fully understand that in an international environment where emerging threats are transnational challenges, those countries cannot be the weak links in the collective security system. It should be noted, for example, that the same national systems for combating illegal financial transactions or the financing of terrorism can also detect assets from individuals or entities subject to sanctions and can allow countries to act accordingly. In most developing countries, therefore, such technical assistance is necessary in order to ensure an adequate flow of information, harmonize actions between the competent services of the State and integrate aspects relating to sanctions into the domestic judicial systems of States.

I cannot end my remarks without raising the issue of natural resources, which are increasingly being addressed by sanctions regimes, particularly in the context of African countries. The challenge for sanctions regimes in the area of natural resources is to thwart the exploitation of natural resources by the entities or individuals targeted so as to prevent them from benefiting from such resources without impinging on legal activities and the rights that the countries and regions concerned have over their own natural resources.

Once again, it is through the strengthening of dialogue and cooperation between the Security Council and its sanctions committees, on the one hand, and the countries and regions concerned, on the other, that sanctions on natural resources can become more effective and legitimate. That takes place by strengthening the national economies of the countries in question and ensuring that those natural resources are preserved for development and not used as a source of conflict and instability.

Ms. Sison (United States of America): I would like to thank Assistant Secretary-General Zerihoun for his briefing.

We welcome the opportunity to highlight the importance and potential of sanctions, which comprise one of the few non-violent tools that the Council has to protect international peace and security. Someone once said that patience is the art of concealing impatience. There are times when I think that the saying can be very appropriately applied to the United States. We feel strongly about our principles and our sovereignty because they come from us, the people. When we see a threat to our national security or when we see violations of human dignity, we want to act sooner rather than later. Most often we stifle that urge and show patience. However, beneath our patience is a fundamental

unwillingness to passively accept insecurity and injustice. Sanctions require us to be patient, but imposing sanctions is one of the most important things that the United Nations can do.

When they are formulated with wide participation and implemented swiftly and consistently, multilateral sanctions are effective. An excellent example is the sanctions that the Council recently strengthened against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, Al-Qaida and their affiliated groups. The United States and Russia worked together in formulating these sanctions and in making sure that they are adapted to the latest terrorist threat. To ensure that these sanctions are implemented fully and fairly, the resolution reaffirmed our support for the Monitoring Team. The vote approving them was unanimous, and, because the Security Council spoke with one voice, these sanctions are showing results. The flow of funds and other support to these terrorist groups has been reduced.

By the same token, when sanctions lack wide support and when they lack enforcement, they are meaningless. Worse than meaningless, they degrade the credibility and effectiveness of the Council. Not only do they fail to stop the threat they are supposed to address, they make the next threat to peace and security more likely. What could be the argument against seeing that sanctions, once imposed, are enforced?

And yet the Council has been unable to come together to agree on routine reporting on sanctions. Even agreeing on a format to discuss cross-cutting sanctions issues seems to be beyond our capability. When it does this, the Council shoots itself in the foot. It takes away from itself one of the best tools to achieve what we are all supposed to be here to achieve: peace, security and respect for human rights. If widespread support and strict enforcement is the way to do sanctions right, the way to do them wrong is unfolding right in front of us.

When a State Member of the United Nations is subject to multiple Security Council resolutions and we allow it to violate these resolutions with impunity, it will not change its behaviour. When States Members of the United Nations do not comply with the sanctions levelled against an aggressor, the Council's threats become hollow. When States Members of the United Nations violate human rights and crack down on their own people for exercising their God-given freedoms and the Council says nothing, it loses credibility. When the Council threatens again and again but refuses to follow up, nothing changes. The United States prefers to impose sanctions through the Security Council. Security Council-imposed sanctions have or should have universal reach. They represent our political unity.

But when the Council fails to act, the United States is not going to wait. When the Council closes its eyes to repeated violations of its sanctions resolutions, the United States begins to lose patience. The United States will act to address threats to our security. We will act to defend universal human rights.

From Venezuela to Zimbabwe and from the situation in Crimea to the war crimes in Syria, we will do what we have to do to defend ourselves, our allies and our values. That is the inevitable choice of a nation facing a dire threat. It is the promise of a people no longer able to conceal their impatience. And it is my great hope that my country and the Council will continue to work together so that we never reach this point.

Mr. Lambertini (Italy): At the outset, I wish to thank the Egyptian presidency for having convened today's meeting and Assistant Secretary-General Zerihoun for his very considered and illuminating briefing.

As the Council and the whole of the United Nations are reviewing the tools at their disposal to maintain or restore international peace and security, my delegation believes that it is important to also assess and review all measures that do not involve the use of force, such as sanctions, and work on actions that can be taken to further improve their elaboration and implementation. It is also important that we do so with an open and balanced view so as to actually improve the use of these important tools by the Council.

Over the years the Security Council has shifted from comprehensive and stand-alone measures to combining smart and targeted measures aimed at the decision-making elites and targeted individuals while avoiding harm to the general population. These represent an improvement of the measures decided by the Council and key aspects to build upon.

The evolution of Security Council measures have included the establishment of panels of experts and monitoring teams to ensure improved implementation of our decisions. In addition, peacekeeping or mission mandates have been looked at so as to ensure that they take into account the effective implementation of Security Council sanctions.

But more needs to be done in this area. For instance, it will be important to further advance with respect to due process, guaranteeing listing and delisting procedures for targeted measures. At the same time, it will be important to also include in the reporting a gender and women's rights analysis, including with respect to the impact of sanctions and a counterterrorism strategy.

If we agree that further progress is needed, then an ongoing assessment and review of Security Council measures becomes essential. Such periodic assessment needs to determine whether the implementation of sanctions regimes continues to be coherent with the objectives set by the Council. Sanctions are not an end in themselves and should be integrated into a wider political strategy. Furthermore, despite the name, they must be intended not as punitive, but rather as a useful tool to support the political process and lead the targeted entities and persons to the path of dialogue and negotiation. We have clear examples of sanction regimes contributing to this end.

The need to ensure coherence between the end and the means and verification on an ongoing basis are important. Establishing or strengthening a mechanism for periodic review could help the Council to adjust its course of action. Such a review process should have a twofold impact: first, on sanctions design, and secondly, on their implementation.

Inputs from Member States, including targeted entities and persons, should help the Council to adjust both current and future restrictive measures for the sake of improving their effectiveness and averting unintended consequences, in particular for the civilian population.

On the implementation side, sanctions committees play an essential role. Also building on our experience as Chair of a Committee, we are convinced that there is a need for constant, sustained and effective dialogue with Member States. The Committee must provide clarity as to the overall framework for the measures and offer guidance both through general guidelines and on a case-by-case basis. In this regard, the role of the Secretariat may prove crucial, as the process of maintaining strict coordination with the Committee Chair could be strengthened.

The Committees should consider greater engagement in outreach activities to illustrate Council measures, thus fostering proper and better implementation, and to provide Member States with a platform to exchange views and receive feedback on these measures.

The same should apply to monitoring teams, expert groups and panels of experts. They should be encouraged to have more genuine and transparent interactions with Member States, more informal opportunities for dialogue and open doors vis-à-vis the Member States.

To sum up, from our point of view what is needed is: first, clarity as to what Member States are asked to do; secondly, guidance and assistance with respect to any issues Member States may raise on sanction implementation; and, thirdly, constant outreach to and dialogue with the membership to improve both the design and the implementation of sanctions. Any review and potential reform of the sanctions system should ensure an appropriate balance between greater coherence and uniformity and the need to take into account the specificities of each situation in which the Council intervenes.

To conclude, I would like to touch on a more general point: cross-cutting issues, including sanctions, justice and accountability, the protection of civilians, and women and children, call for coherence in Security Council action. If the Council is perceived as lacking coherence in its proceedings, there will be issues in terms of legitimacy and acceptance of the measures adopted, the spillover consequences of the implementation of such measures.

As the Council is aware, we have been awaiting the broadening of the work of the Informal Working Group on International Tribunals so as to make it become an informal working group on justice and accountability in situations of conflict. Were we to follow a similar approach with the issue of sanctions, Italy would focus its attention on issues of implementation, on including all relevant actors and on the overarching goal of providing constructive contributions to sanctions design.

Mr. Orrenius Skau (Sweden): I, too, would like to thank Egypt for having organized today's briefing on this important topic and Assistant Secretary-General Zerihoun for his valuable presentation this morning.

In the mid-1980s, Sweden introduced economic sanctions against the apartheid regime of South Africa. Those sanctions were essentially unilateral in nature but had strong political symbolism. Since then, Sweden has been engaged in processes aimed at making sanctions more effective and transparent, including,

most recently, the High-level Review of United Nations Sanctions (see S/2015/432). Existing efforts, such as the High-level Review with its 150 recommendations, remain relevant and should be followed up on so as to improve the implementation and effectiveness of United Nations sanctions.

Sanctions can be described as an effective measure between words and war. We believe that United Nations sanctions, when properly applied and well calibrated within a broader political strategy, can serve as a versatile tool for responding to security challenges. That is why we have supported the effective implementation of current sanctions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and support swift additional measures in view of the recent violations, while at the same time underlining that creative diplomatic efforts and dialogue are urgently needed, in parallel, so as to find a peaceful, diplomatic and comprehensive solution.

The legal basis for United Nations sanctions derives from the Charter of the United Nations. The sanctions instrument has evolved over time. Over the past quarter of a century, the Security Council has deployed sanctions with increasing regularity and with increasingly broad aims. We must build on that experience and learn from less effective measures, as well as draw lessons from the successes.

The evolution from comprehensive to targeted sanctions has largely addressed many concerns about unintended consequences and adverse effects. Over time, assessments and pre-assessments have been conducted, and there has been a steady move towards standardizing humanitarian exemptions. The Security Council could, nevertheless, put even more emphasis on the assessment of the impact of its measures, both ex ante and ex post. Additionally, sanctions regimes and measures should be periodically reviewed by the Council to ensure that their objectives are being properly met. The Council should also conduct periodic reviews of listed individuals and entities in all sanctions regimes so as to ensure that information is up-to-date and that the listings remain appropriate.

As we have heard from many colleagues here today, sanctions can never be successful in isolation. They must always be part of a broader political strategy, featuring elements of peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding. Sanctions must also be evaluated within an overall approach to support peace and security. When evaluating sanctions, one must remember that every sanctions regime is unique and that targeted sanctions have multiple purposes.

It is important to safeguard and build upon the achievements made so far in the areas of the rule of law and due process, in particular through the establishment of the Office of the Ombudsperson. Our common obligation to implement decisions by the Council coexists with obligations to respect fundamental human rights. By further improving fair and clear procedures, the Council would render the sanctions tool more effective and legitimate, thereby enhancing the authority of the Council and that of the United Nations, as a whole.

We would also like to see greater attention being paid to women, peace and security and children in armed conflict in both thematic and country-specific actions on sanctions, for example, by adding sexual and gender-based violence as criteria for designation and inviting the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict and Children and Armed Conflict to brief sanctions committees. Furthermore, we would like to see gender analysis in the reporting of experts, including on the impacts of sanctions and counter-terrorism strategies and the gender dimensions of the flow of arms and the illicit trafficking in humans, drugs and natural resources.

In conclusion, let me, once again, underline that sanctions are a key instrument in the limited tool box that the Council has at its disposal to prevent conflicts and promote peace. We hope that today's discussion, as well as efforts to implement the recommendations of the High-level Review, and, not least, the ongoing hard work in the sanctions committees will help to further enhance the effectiveness and credibility of this important tool.

Mr. Bessho (Japan): I also thank Mr. Zerihoun for his presentation.

At the outset, Japan thanks Egypt for its initiative to hold today's briefing. United Nations sanctions are one of the measures provided for by the Charter of the United Nations to maintain or restore international peace and security. Where used properly, they can be effective, and they should be well integrated into broader strategies.

Sanctions are tools for the achievement of specific political objectives. Those objectives are wide-ranging, including the restoration of peace after civil war, the

prohibition of support for terrorists, the disarmament of armed groups and denuclearization. Each sanctions regime should be tailor-made to its specific context.

Sanctions are not imposed for their own sake, and they are certainly not tools for punishment. They should have clear goals and exit strategies. Each sanctions regime generally has its own internal exemption clauses or mechanisms to minimize unwanted adverse effects. To that end, the evolution in the way the Security Council uses smart sanctions, including financial sanctions, is a welcome one. The periodic review of sanctions in each sanctions committee could be useful.

Once the Security Council decides to take certain sanctions measures, they need to be fully implemented in order to be effective. That can be challenging and complex, and may require both time and capacity-building on the part of Member States. Neighbouring countries have a particularly vital role to play in ensuring that the sanctions measures are effective. We must all work together to address the problem of sanctions evasion and loopholes.

I would also like to emphasize that where sanctions have been agreed upon and adopted by the Council, we should first work for their full and faithful implementation by each Member State before we discuss their effectiveness. Member States' awareness and capacity-building are key.

Japan has long been a supporter of capacity-building efforts aimed at strengthening implementation and will continue to provide support to that end. We believe that where sanctions are selected among the various tools available, the Council must ensure that they are as effective as possible in achieving their desired aim.

The President (*spoke in Arabic*): I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of Egypt.

At the outset, I would like to thank the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Mr. Tayé-Brook Zerihoun, for his important briefing on this vital aspect of the work of the Security Council.

As stipulated in Article 41, Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations grants the Security Council the mandate to take various measures to confront threats to international peace and security without the use of force. Despite the use of the word "sanctions" to describe such measures, the Charter does not make any reference to that term. The term has been widely used in Security Council resolutions that impose such measures. The Council has a great responsibility to clarify that concept, which is a commonly used term, and its punitive connotations. The measures stipulated in the Charter seek to maintain or restore international peace and security, not to punish any party.

The Council has made considerable progress in developing the concept of sanctions, moving from comprehensive to smarter and more effective measures, while benefiting from the knowledge accumulated from previous experiences. Because of that, we have been able to mitigate the unintended negative repercussions of the sanctions, especially on civilians and States that are not party to conflicts. We have also been able to limit the measures to parties that are a threat to international peace and security. These improvements have helped to make the measures more effective and improve the likelihood that they will achieve the desired result.

While this progress is commendable, it is not enough. The uniqueness of every new threat to international peace and stability means that we have to adopt sanctions regimes that are tailored to particular situations and suited to a threat's particular nature, treating each on a case-by-case basis. That does not mean, however, that we should not make use of previous experiences of sanctions regimes and lessons learned from their implementation. Maintaining an identical approach and a narrow perspective while considering sanctions on a case-by-case basis will not help us improve them unless we also make them complementary with other, more comprehensive and inclusive mechanisms that seek to study all the means that can potentially improve this important tool in both style and substance.

Finding appropriate mechanisms for dialogue; monitoring, assessing and incorporating lessons learned from previous sanctions regimes; and taking the views of every involved party into consideration are therefore elements that the Council should not undermine, underestimate or ignore, considering all the means to achieve it.

The Arria-Formula meeting organized by Egypt last month, entitled "Enhancing the design process of United Nations sanctions regimes: perspectives from all stakeholders", presented a genuine opportunity to listen to the views of three African countries on the impact of sanctions on efforts aimed at stabilization. Wide participation by Council members and the broader

United Nations membership showed the depth of the interest in this issue and the importance of studying and analysing previous experience, which can help us improve the design of our sanctions regimes. Ensuring that this tool is just and fair will help to guarantee its effectiveness, while any abuse of it could undermine its credibility with the international community and lead to repercussions that could aggravate crises rather than help to settle them.

We should also help Member States understand the diverse nature of sanctions regimes and build their technical capacity to implement sanctions measures properly. Egypt is ready to contribute to that important effort. In that regard, I would like to thank the Secretariat for taking part in the first round table held to raise awareness of the sanctions regimes, which we hosted in Cairo on 12 and 13 July with the participation of Egypt's national coordinating committee on United Nations sanctions. We believe that such cooperation is a model that deserves support and look forward to expanding it, including at the regional level.

I have listened carefully to members' statements today and noted their differences of opinion and position. However, I also noted their agreement on the importance of developing United Nations sanctions regimes. The Council has a collective responsibility to translate those positions into action that demonstrates our seriousness and good intentions, sending a clear message to all members of the United Nations and the international community that the Council is present on this issue and aware of the importance of this vital tool and the need to develop it properly. The Council's role is not complete if it is not accompanied by a genuine partnership with all Member States and stakeholders, creating the channels and mechanisms that will enable it to listen to stakeholders' views, which constitute an important tool for helping it achieve its goal of improving current and future sanctions regimes. This would also enable the Council to hold periodic dialogues on the issue and take any measures that might be necessary.

In that regard, Egypt looks forward to cooperating with Member States during its presidency of the Council and to pursuing our collective efforts to translate our positions and the positive statements we have heard today into political will and practical measures. Those positions, and our collective will, will help us to agree on practical procedures and effective mechanisms that will enable the Council to further develop its sanctions regimes so as to achieve their objective as a tool for restoring peace and security while avoiding any negative repercussions or deviations from its desired objectives, rectifying them according to each individual case.

I now resume my functions as President of the Security Council.

There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers.

The meeting rose at 11.50 a.m.

United Nations S/PV.8019

Security Council

Seventy-second year

Provisional

8019th meeting
Saturday, 5 August 2017, 3 p.m.
New York

President:	Mr. Aboulatta	(Egypt)
Members:	Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	Mr. Llorentty Soliz
	China	Mr. Liu Jieyi
	Ethiopia	Mr. Alemu
	France	Mr. Delattre
	Italy	Mr. Lambertini
	Japan	Mr. Bessho
	Kazakhstan	Mr. Sadykov
	Russian Federation	Mr. Nebenzia
	Senegal	Mr. Seck
	Sweden	Mr. Skau
	Ukraine	Mr. Vitrenko
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Mr. Rycroft
	United States of America	Mrs. Haley
	Uruguay	Mr. Bermúdez

Agenda

Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea

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The meeting was called to order at 3.05 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea

The President (*spoke in Arabic*): In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of the Republic of Korea to participate in this meeting.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.

Members of the Council have before them document S/2017/674, which contains the text of a draft resolution submitted by the United States of America.

The Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour:

Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation, Senegal, Sweden, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Uruguay

The President (*spoke in Arabic*): The draft resolution received 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution has been adopted unanimously as resolution 2371 (2017).

I now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements after the vote.

Mrs. Haley (United States of America): Exactly one month ago, I came before members of the Security Council and declared that it was a dark day for the world because of the dangerous and irresponsible actions of North Korea. Almost one week ago, I said that the days of talking were over and that it was time to act. Today, the full Security Council has come together to put the North Korean dictator on notice, and this time, the Council has matched its words and actions. Resolution 2371 (2017), which we have adopted today, is a strong, united step towards holding North Korea accountable for its behaviour.

Today, the Security Council increased the penalty of North Korea's ballistic-missile activity to a whole new level. North Korea's irresponsible and careless acts have just proved to be quite costly to the regime. Today's resolution is the single largest economic sanctions package ever levelled against the North Korean regime. The price which the North Korean leadership will pay for its continued nuclear and missile development will be the loss of one-third of its exports and hard currency. This is the most stringent set of sanctions imposed on any country in a generation. These sanctions will cut deep, and in doing so will give the North Korean leadership a taste of the deprivation it has chosen to inflict on the North Korean people.

Nuclear and ballistic missile development is expensive. The revenues which the North Korean Government receives are not going towards feeding its people. Instead, the North Korean regime is literally starving its people and enslaving them in mines and factories in order to fund these illegal nuclear programmes. Even as famine looms on the horizon; even as the regime continues to ask for international assistance to cope with devastating floods and a possible drought later this year, its displays of aggression take precedence over its own people.

Even as we respond to the North Korean nuclear threat, the United States will continue to stand up for the human dignity and rights of the North Korean people. It is the continued suffering of the North Korean people that should remind the Security Council that, while resolution 2371 (2017) is a significant step forward, it is not nearly enough. The threat of an outlaw, nuclearized North Korean dictatorship remains. The unimaginable living conditions of so many of the North Korean people are unchanged. The North Korean regime continues to show that widespread violations of human rights go hand in hand with threats to international peace and security.

I thank each and every one of my colleagues who worked so hard to bring this resolution to a vote. I have previously pointed out that China has a critical role to play on matters related to North Korea. I want to personally thank the Chinese delegation for the important contributions it made to the resolution. While the Security Council has done good work, the members of the Security Council — and all United Nations Member States — must do more to increase the pressure on North Korea. We must work together

to fully implement the sanctions we imposed today and those imposed in past resolutions.

The step we take together today is an important one, but we should not fool ourselves into thinking we have solved the problem. We are not even close. The North Korean threat has not left us. It is rapidly growing more dangerous. We have seen two intercontinental ballistic missiles fired in just the past month. Further action is required. The United States is taking and will continue to take prudent defensive measures to protect ourselves and our allies. Our annual joint military exercises, for instance, are transparent and defence-oriented. They have been carried out regularly and openly for nearly 40 years. They will continue.

Our goal remains a stable Korean peninsula, at peace and without nuclear weapons. We want only security and prosperity for all nations, including North Korea. Until then, this resolution and prior ones will be implemented to the fullest to maximize pressure on North Korea to change its ways. Today is a good day at the United Nations. We will need many more such days in order to peacefully resolve the crisis that has been created by North Korea's dangerous and illegal actions. As I have said before, time is short, but today we have taken one step in the right direction.

I again thank my colleagues and their teams for their action and support towards sending a strong message to the North Korean regime.

Mr. Rycroft (United Kingdom): North Korea is no longer a threat faced by a single country or a single region. It is instead a threat that confronts us all. The two tests in the past month were of an intercontinental missile, extending the threat much further than before, to many more countries. In a world where North Korean missile tests seem routine, let me be clear — this is not business as usual. Let us make no mistake. As North Korea's missile capabilities advance, so too does its contempt and disregard for the Security Council. We must meet this belligerence with clear, unequivocal condemnation and with clear, unequivocal consequences.

Today, we have banned North Korean exports of coal, iron ore, lead and seafood. These are the lifeline exports that sustain Kim Jong Un's deadly aspirations. In simple terms, should the North Korean regime continue its reckless pursuit of an illegal missile programme and a deadly nuclear programme, it will have vastly less resources to do so.

We have also capped the number of foreign workers from North Korea. Every year, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea sends thousands of ordinary workers overseas. They often endure poor conditions and long hours, and their toil serves to provide critical foreign currency for North Korean Government coffers. This is undoubtedly a form of modern slavery, and today we have taken the first step to ending it. The world will now monitor and curtail work authorizations for these desperate expatriates. And those who are already victims of this abusive system can trust that the United Kingdom will continue to work towards a complete end to North Korea's institutionalized modern slavery.

North Korea bears full responsibility for the measures we have enacted today. By acting in flagrant violation of its legal obligations, and by going against the will of the Security Council expressed in countless resolutions, North Korea has chosen the path it now finds itself on. It is a path that, at a minimum, will lead to further suffering for its own people, and at most could prove to be catastrophic for the whole world.

It does not have to be this way. North Korea should forgo the path of provocation — forgo the path of further escalation. There is no reason why the people of North Korea cannot share the normal, prosperous life of their neighbours. The world would welcome them, not threaten them. So in the Chamber, let us once again call on North Korea to halt and reverse its nuclear and missile development programmes. Let us once again call on it to prioritize the well-being of its people over its illegal and destabilizing military programmes.

North Korea's security and well-being do not depend on nuclear weapons. They do not depend on far-reaching missiles. They do not depend on a myth of self-sufficient defiance of the wider world. To live in constant tension with the world cannot be in the interests of North Korea's regime, let alone its people.

We have taken a step forward. We have spoken with a unified voice that we are ready to act in an unprecedented way in response to North Korea's reckless nuclear pursuit. Every country must ensure that these measures are adhered to. Every country must live up to its word. This time, there is too much at stake. We simply cannot afford to fail.

Mr. Delattre (France) (*spoke in French*): France welcomes the unanimous adoption of resolution 2371 (2017), which reinforces the sanctions imposed by the United Nations on North Korea as a result of the ballistic

missile launches that took place on 3 and 28 July. We thank the United States for its leadership in the negotiations, as well as for its unwavering commitment to this issue, which today is more important than ever for international peace and security.

For years, North Korea has pursued the forced development of its nuclear and ballistic programmes, initiated at the highest level of the regime. It seeks methodically to acquire an operational nuclear arsenal, at the cost of the sacrifice of its own population. The launches of the past few weeks have taken us a step further towards the threat posed by North Korean programmes, clearly demonstrating Pyongyang's determination to bring the entire international community within the reach of its missiles. This is an unacceptable situation, which directly challenges the security of us all.

Let us not deceive ourselves — the threat is global, and even beyond this grave and direct threat, it is the entire non-proliferation regime that is in danger, even though it is one of the pillars of our system of collective security. That is why weakness is not an option, and why France has been convinced from the outset that only a position of great firmness can open the way to the political and diplomatic strategy that is itself the only possible outcome to this crisis.

In that context, it is more urgent than ever to put an end to North Korea's nuclear and ballistic programmes and bring Pyongyang back to the negotiating table. In recent months, however, despite repeated warnings, North Korea has persistently ignored every injunction by the Council and has defied the international community as a whole. Considering the seriousness of the threat that is currently hanging over all of us, stamping our authority on the situation is a matter of urgency. Bringing to bear the greatest diplomatic and economic pressure possible is the only way to put a stop to these programmes, bring North Korea back to the negotiating table and promote a peaceful solution to the current crisis.

Through today's resolution, and beyond its unambiguous condemnation of North Korea's unjustifiable actions, the Council is articulating two complementary actions — punishing a new group of individuals and entities that are central to the functioning of the regime and its programmes, and imposing an embargo on several key sectors of activity, including the capacity to provide the liquidity that Pyongyang needs to finance its illegal programmes. Clearly, these measures, which will probably cut the regime's income by an amount estimated to be more than $1 billion a year, are likely to change the situation. They emphasize the scope of the tools available to the Council, whose effectiveness is increased tenfold when it takes action and does so unanimously, as it has today. Of course, they are accompanied by humanitarian exemption clauses aimed at minimizing the consequences for the people of North Korea, who are not targeted by these measures.

The new resolution's determined response is also a new warning. This dangerous and irresponsible leap on the part of the regime, whose irrationality is equalled only by its methodical pursuit of its goal, must stop. North Korea must understand that if it continues to choose the road of escalation and provocation, we will have no choice but to ramp up the pressure. And one of the messages that we have unanimously sent today is that we are ready to do that. As we have said a number of times, sanctions are not an end in themselves but a means of forcing Pyongyang to return to a serious dialogue. In the face of the regime's irresponsible, unjustifiable stubbornness, today we have no alternative to firmness if we are to bring North Korea back to the path of reason and thereby pave the way for a political and diplomatic outcome of this crisis.

Mr. Vitrenko (Ukraine): Ukraine welcomes today's unanimous adoption of resolution 2371 (2017) and commends the efforts of the delegations involved in drafting and bringing the text to a vote, under the strong leadership of the United States.

North Korea's advancing nuclear- and ballistic-missile programmes are close to the most significant proliferation challenge of our time. Ukraine firmly condemns Pyongyang's continuous illegal activities. Besides their highly visible manifestation in the form of nuclear tests and missile launches, it has also crafted an intricate system for evading sanctions in order to circumvent the restrictions and prohibitions already in place. Today's resolution not only strengthens the existing measures, it reinforces them with additional sectoral and targeted sanctions and clarifies some of the Council's previous measures. It also unambiguously affirms the Council's openness to a dialogue on a peaceful and diplomatic solution to the situation on the Korean peninsula and its determination to avoid affecting the North Korean population.

Ukraine has always been committed to taking effective multilateral action against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Our collective decision today is a clear demonstration of the Council's firm and united stance in responding decisively to this threat to the global non-proliferation regime. I would also like to emphasize the importance of ensuring that all Member States implement the Council's relevant resolutions promptly and comprehensively in order to make the sanctions produce results. We need to act jointly at the global level if we are to eliminate the risk of further provocations and curb the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's rampant nuclear and missile ambitions.

Mr. Bermúdez (Uruguay) (*spoke in Spanish*): Uruguay voted in favour of resolution 2371 (2017) and welcomes its unanimous adoption by the Security Council. The fact that Council members are united on the issue is crucial to our response to the serious threat that North Korea's defiant attitude in continuing its nuclear and ballistic-missile programme poses to international peace and security, with two — not one but two — launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles in the month of July alone. That is a clear and flagrant violation of every relevant Security Council resolution. As if that was not enough of an abuse, it also undermines the impulse for the common good and the spirit of peaceful coexistence that govern our Organization. Once again, Uruguay reiterates how important it is to ensure that the Government of North Korea respects all the Council's resolutions and abandons its nuclear ambitions.

As my delegation said recently at the briefing session on general issues pertaining to sanctions, if we are to improve the effectiveness of United Nations sanctions, the sanction regimes must do their job — effectiveness being understood as the ability to ultimately achieve the goals that the sanctions are aimed at. Sanctions regimes should be designed to be a tool that enables the Security Council to achieve a goal. To be effective, that tool should complement others, such as mediation and dialogue. The goal of the sanctions regime imposed on North Korea should be to achieve the peaceful denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

In that regard, I am referring to what my delegation has already said about the importance of working to reduce tensions on the Korean peninsula and making every effort to return to the path of dialogue so as to reach a definitive settlement of this very serious situation. It is also important to ensure a greater commitment and willingness on the part of Member States to comply with international obligations and Security Council sanctions, while at the same time, in this case, avoiding any adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of North Korea.

Lastly, I would like to reaffirm that Uruguay is committed and determined to continue working for a peaceful diplomatic and political solution for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

Mr. Liu Jieyi (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): The Security Council resolutions on this subject contain explicit provisions against any launches by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea using ballistic-missile technology. China opposes the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's launching activities, which violate Council resolutions and defy the will of the entire international community.

We have always insisted on the importance of denuclearizing the Korean peninsula, upholding peace and stability there and seeking a solution through dialogue and consultation. We have always been firmly opposed to chaos and conflict on the peninsula. In our view, that is what resolution 2371 (2017) is all about. Its unanimous adoption by the Council demonstrates that the international community has a united position with regard to the nuclear issue on the peninsula.

There are three major components to this resolution. First, it sets out further sanctions targeting the nuclear and missile programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Secondly, the resolution does not intend to impact negatively activities that are not prohibited by the resolution, such as economic activities and cooperation, or food and humanitarian assistance. Thirdly, it calls for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks, commits to finding a solution through peaceful, diplomatic and political means, and stresses the importance of de-escalating tensions on the peninsula by the parties concerned. China believes that these are part and parcel of this resolution, and all parties should implement the provisions contained therein fully and earnestly.

China has been making tireless efforts to promote the denuclearization of the peninsula and to uphold peace and stability there. On 4 July, China and Russia issued a joint statement on the issue of the Korean peninsula. Both of our countries put forward a road map for the resolution of this issue, which is based respectively on China's idea of a due approach, which

calls for parallel efforts, while moving forward with both the denuclearization of the peninsula and the establishment of a peace mechanism based on the suspension for suspension initiative, which calls for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to suspend its nuclear and missile activities, and for the United States and the Republic of Korea to suspend their large-scale military exercises, as well as on Russia's step-by-step approach. This China-Russia joint initiative is realistic and feasible. It aims to tackle both the symptoms and the root causes of the problem and to seek a solution through an integrated approach. We hope that this initiative will receive a response and support from the relevant parties.

China has taken note that the United States has recently indicated once again that it is not seeking a regime change or a regime collapse in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and that it is in no hurry to push for the reunification of the peninsula. The United States has also indicated that its troops will not push through the thirty-eighth parallel. It is our hope that the United States will translate these "four no's" into concrete policies towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Beefing up military deployment on the peninsula is not in the interest of realizing denuclearization there or of maintaining regional peace and stability. The deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence missile system will not bring a solution to the issue of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear testing and missile launching. What it will do is seriously undermine the strategic balance of the region. As such, it is detrimental to the strategic security interest of regional countries, including China.

China strongly urges the parties concerned to halt the process of this deployment and to dismantle relevant equipment. Realizing denuclearization and durable peace and stability on the Korean peninsula is in the interests of all the parties. China urges the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to respect Council resolutions and to cease taking actions that might further escalate tensions on the peninsula.

We hope that the parties concerned will immediately take effective action to prevent the situation from further escalating, create conditions for the resumption of talks and undertake efforts to bring, at an early date, the nuclear issue of the peninsula back to the right track, that of seeking a peaceful solution through dialogue and consultation.

Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): The Russian Federation supported the adoption of resolution 2371 (2017), on sanctions against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. We understand the need to halt Pyongyang's missile and nuclear programme, which is unacceptable to us. We share the feeling of neighbouring States in the region. The ballistic missiles launched without warning from North Korea pose a major risk to marine and air transit in the region, as well as to the lives of ordinary civilians. We call on the North Korean Government to end the banned programmes and to return to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the oversight of the International Atomic Energy Agency. We also call on that country to join the Chemical Weapons Convention.

All must understand that progress towards the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula will be difficult so long as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea perceives a direct threat to its own security. For that is how the North Koreans view the build-up in military activity in the region, which takes on the forms of frequent wide-ranging exercises and manoeuvres by the United States and allies as they deploy strategic bombers, naval forces and aircraft carriers to the region. Another destabilizing factor in the region is the scaling up in the Republic Korea of the American Terminal High Altitude Area Defence missile defence system. We have repeatedly noted that this not only constitutes an irritant, but also undermines the overall military balance in the region and calls into question the security of neighbouring States. We hope that the assurances provided by the Secretary of State of the United States were sincere, and that the United States is not seeking to dismantle the existing situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or to forcibly unite the peninsula or intervene militarily in the country.

We are concerned that the paragraph we proposed for the resolution did not receive support. Potential military misadventures on either side are liable to spell disaster for regional and global stability. We stress that the additional restrictive measures imposed through the resolution against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea cannot be an end in themselves. They need to be a tool to engage the country in constructive talks. It is not possible to settle the Korean issue through sanctions and pressure being brought to bear on Pyongyang alone. The resolution must be a part of a

political strategy, which is yet to be crafted and agreed on, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea must be engaged in this.

Sanctions must not be used for the economic asphyxiation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or to deliberately worsen the humanitarian situation. This applies in particular to illegal, unilateral restrictions that strike civilian sectors, which are unrelated to the missile and nuclear programmes of the country. Such sanctions may lead to the significant deterioration of the living conditions of the North Korean people — incidentally, as United Nations humanitarian agencies are warning about. Experience shows the destructiveness of unilateral measures when sanctions, instead of diplomatic tools, are used as a universal means of settling such issues.

It is clear that in order to normalize the situation on the Korean peninsula, we need a comprehensive approach that includes an end to the missile and nuclear tests of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the rejection of a reinforced military infrastructure, and the reduction of the scale of exercises and manoeuvres. There is a need to create trust among States in the region. We must abandon the obsolete, ineffective algorithms for addressing the nuclear problem in the Korean peninsula, and we must address this issue through unique creative approaches. Isolation and pressure need to be replaced by dialogue and negotiations, and that is the thrust of the Russian and Chinese dual suspension and parallel progress proposal.

We recall that our countries have drafted a joint road map that prevents the threat or use of force and proposes a comprehensive solution to all problems on the peninsula, including the nuclear one, through political and diplomatic means, without precondition, and through political talks and the resumption of Six-Party Talks. These ideas warrant attention as they represent a possible starting point to break the deadlock and resume negotiations. We must find ways to engage in dialogue with the leadership of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and to prompt meaningful dialogue on the nuclear and missile issues. Once again we would like to draw attention to the joint Russo-Chinese statement on the settlement of the situation on the Korean peninsula, dated 4 July.

We should like to draw attention to some contentious issues in the resolution. Of course Pyongyang is violating the sanctions against it, but it is not providing the components of weapons of mass destruction to non-State actors. There is no direct link between the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and official Pyongyang actions. This reference in the context of sanctions must be ended. This is counterproductive for the resolution itself above all.

More than ever before, it is important to jointly seek a political solution to the range of issues plaguing the Korean peninsula. Following the adoption of the resolution today, the pressure of sanctions has been exhausted. We stand ready to work collectively here. At the same time, the United Nations must step up efforts to deliver humanitarian assistance to the people of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The relevant exemptions, provided for in the resolution at our insistence, enable us to further address this.

Mr. Seck (Senegal) (*spoke in French*): The delegation of Senegal welcomes the unanimous adoption by the Security Council of resolution 2371 (2017), on nuclear non-proliferation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, as well as the constructive spirit that prevailed during the negotiations held under the leadership of the United States delegation as penholder.

With this resolution, the Security Council has, for the second consecutive time this year and the third time in less than 10 months, strengthened sanctions against the Pyongyang authorities as a logical reaction to the country's methodical pursuit of its ballistic and nuclear programme. Indeed, the launch of ballistic missiles conducted by North Korea on 3 and 28 July, in deliberate violation of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, represents a serious threat to peace and security on the Korean peninsula and beyond. It is also a direct threat to air navigation security and to the security of the millions of people who live, work and travel in the region. There were no warnings or advance notice of the launches, which overshot by far the maritime and aerial jurisdiction of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, affecting other areas that are among the most densely populated in the world.

Senegal expresses its deep concern about these actions and wishes to echo the words that our Secretary-General, Mr. António Guterres, addressed to the North Korean authorities, urging them to fully abide by its international obligations in this area in a clear, irreversible and verifiable way.

It is for these reasons that the delegation of Senegal voted in favour of resolution 2371 (2017), which, in addition to freezing the assets of and banning travel by certain individuals and entities, imposes bans on the export of coal, iron and iron ore, as well as restrictions on access to the international banking system.

The delegation of Senegal will await the report that the Security Council, through this resolution, has requested the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), on non-proliferation in North Korea, to provide within 15 days. The report is to highlight any additional items related to proliferation and conventional weapons that could be added to the consolidated list of measures already taken.

Another important element that led to Senegal's positive vote is the fact that the resolution reaffirms the Council's resolve to prevent the measures adopted from having any negative humanitarian repercussions on the North Korean civilian population, normal economic activities, cooperation or the provision of food assistance. Senegal welcomes the exemptions granted to activities carried out by diplomatic or consular missions in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as well as those related to the humanitarian assistance provided by the United Nations or in coordination with it.

The delegation of Senegal reiterates that this series of targeted measures, taken in order to respond to the challenge represented by the North Korean nuclear and ballistic programme, must be part and parcel of a comprehensive political strategy aimed at engaging the parties in dialogue, with the support of the international community.

I therefore reiterate my country's commitment to a political and diplomatic solution to this issue and express Senegal's support for the relaunching of the Six-Party Talks, so as to achieve the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and promote peaceful coexistence among the countries in the region, with full respect for each other's sovereignty and on the basis of the commitments undertaken by the parties in the joint declaration of 19 September 2005.

I would like to conclude by reiterating our call on the members of the Security Council and the international community to launch at long last this crucial phase in the situation on the Korean peninsula.

Mr. Orrenius Skau (Sweden): Sweden welcomes the adoption of resolution 2371 (2017) today, which shows that the Council continues to stand united and that we are fully determined to deal with the growing threat posed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear and missile programmes. With this vote, the Security Council continues to shoulder its responsibility and assert its authority with respect to a situation that jeopardizes international peace and security.

The latest missile test, again of intercontinental range, is yet another breach of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea international obligations, in defiance of numerous Security Council resolutions. This is a cause for utmost concern for the region and, indeed, for the whole world. The potential dangers are evident, and the threat is growing. We express our deepest solidarity with the neighbouring countries and their peoples, living under the constant shadow of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's threatening behaviour.

Sweden therefore condemns the latest tests in the strongest possible terms. We reiterate our call on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to cease all development of its ballistic-missile and nuclear-weapons programme. We urge it to take immediate steps towards complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of the programme, in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions. We further call on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to speedily and unconditionally re-engage in a meaningful and credible dialogue with the international community, with a view to fulfilling the obligations laid out by the Council.

The international community must, on its part, redouble efforts to effectively and fully implement current resolutions and to act swiftly to implement the new sanctions adopted today. All States Members of the United Nations must do their utmost in this regard.

At the same time, sanctions alone will never solve this situation. Sanctions must be accompanied by dialogue and confidence-building measures so as to reach a long-term, sustainable solution. There is an urgent need to avoid escalation and to take steps to prepare for a peaceful, diplomatic and comprehensive solution to the situation on the Korean peninsula, and for the wider region.

It is also of key importance to re-establish inter-Korean communication channels. As a member of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, Sweden

strongly encourages the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to resume contact and cooperation with the Commission at the border station in Panmunjom. This would contribute to reducing tensions as well as increase trust and transparency.

We must contribute to finding diplomatic openings, and we welcome all initiatives to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue. As we have said previously in the Council, it is deeply worrying that tensions have continued to rise in recent months, and the potential for mistakes, misunderstanding and miscalculation is high. A regional security mechanism should be the medium-term goal.

There is no military solution to this situation. We strongly support today's resolution and stand firmly united with Council members in condemning the actions of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. But in parallel, creative diplomacy aimed at bringing about dialogue and negotiations is also urgently needed. We call again on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to re-engage in a credible and meaningful dialogue with the international community.

Mr. Lambertini (Italy): Italy welcomes the unanimous adoption of resolution 2371 (2017). We recognize the leadership role played the United States on this issue and we thank the United States mission for its untiring effort to bring us to reach today's important result.

Today the Security Council is once again — this is the second time in 2017 — sending an unequivocal message to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (see resolution 2356 (2017)). The international community is united in condemning North Korea's increasing provocations and is determined to confront this new level of threat to international peace and security by taking further action. As demonstrated by the latest intercontinental ballistic-missile launches, which Italy condemns in the strongest terms, North Korea is advancing illegally towards an operational nuclear capability, severely undermining our collective security and the global non-proliferation regime. This is an extraordinary situation that calls for proportional measures.

The resolution that we have adopted today provides for the broadest, most comprehensive set of sanctions to have been applied by the Council in many years. It will remain in force for as long as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea continues to pursue nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. We therefore urge the North Korean regime to take immediate measures to abandon its nuclear and ballistic-missile programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. In consultation with key partners, Italy also stands ready at the appropriate time to support additional autonomous restrictive measures in the European Union context.

We reaffirm that the Security Council's concern is directed towards the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and not its people, who continue to suffer as resources are diverted from economic development towards military, nuclear and ballistic-missile programmes. As in the past, we will remain vigilant in order to ensure that these new restrictive measures do not have any adverse consequences from a humanitarian perspective.

While increasing pressure on the North Korean leadership at this juncture is essential, we call on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to make credible progress on its obligation to denuclearize, thereby enabling negotiations leading to a peaceful solution as stated in the European Union Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions of 17 July 2017. In this regard, Italy reaffirms that sanctions are not an end in themselves but a means to promote the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's full compliance.

Finally, as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), I would like to restate Italy's unwavering commitment to the full and effective implementation of all Security Council resolutions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. We will reach out to the full United Nations membership in order to ensure that these latest measures are applied quickly and comprehensively.

Mr. Alemu (Ethiopia): We welcome the unanimous adoption of resolution 2371 (2017), condemning in the strongest terms the continuing ballistic-missile tests conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in violation of various Security Council resolutions. The step taken today, imposing additional sanctions measures as a consequence, is therefore proper.

It is important that we continue to maintain the unity of the Council in addressing this problem. In our view, this is perhaps the most critical factor that may ensure a breakthrough eventually, if, in addition, the matter is handled with a great deal of care and wisdom.

The nuclear- and ballistic-missile-related programmes of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea pose serious threats to regional and international peace and security. It is absolutely crucial that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea immediately cease these provocative actions in order to reduce the tension in the Korean peninsula and prevent its further escalation. That is why we believe taking the measure the Council took today was made unavoidable.

It is becoming all the more apparent that this situation could get out of hand if it is not managed properly. We believe it is important to make additional efforts to try to open up possibilities for the diplomatic path towards the resolution of a problem that is indeed both complex and dangerous.

One thing is undeniable — and on this all reasonable people must agree — and that is that there is a need for channels of communication to avoid the risk of miscalculation and reduce tensions in the Korean peninsula. That is why we believe that there is an urgent need for finding a lasting, comprehensive political and diplomatic solution to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea issue through dialogue and negotiation. It is indeed a good thing that the just-adopted resolution takes this into account. This requires that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea return to its international commitments on denuclearization and fully comply with the relevant resolutions of Security Council.

Finally, the latest ballistic-missile launch by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea reminds us that the full implementation of the Council's resolutions by all Member States is much more critical now than ever before. We believe that Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) and the Panel of Experts that supports it will continue to play a critical role in this regard, and they should be encouraged to further strengthen their engagement with Member States to improve implementation of the measures.

Let me conclude by reiterating, once again, Ethiopia's firm commitment to continuing to work towards the full implementation of these Security Council resolutions, including the one that we have adopted today.

Mr. Sadykov (Kazakhstan): We support the adoption of resolution 2371 (2017), which envisages tough sanctions as a means to persuade Pyongyang to change its course in favour of a nuclear-weapon-free future. The resolution also leaves room for the resumption of dialogue or a six-party mechanism for negotiations.

Kazakhstan strongly condemns as irresponsible and dangerous North Korea's international-range ballistic-missile launches as they undermine our shared international efforts to strengthen regional and, ultimately, international peace and security. Such actions are in serious violation of Security Council resolutions and pose a threat to peace. Furthermore, they destabilize the situation in the North-East Asia region, as well as globally.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's irresponsible policy negatively affects the global process of nuclear non-proliferation and undermines our collective efforts to ensure a nuclear-weapon-free future for the planet. We urge the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to abandon its nuclear ambitions for the sake of the security and development of its people and for the benefit of all humankind.

The threat of the missile and nuclear programmes of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea makes it imperative for all parties concerned to intensify their efforts to find a mutually acceptable solution through the early resumption of negotiations. A solution to this situation is possible only through dialogue and not through any military strategy triggered by the provocative actions of the North Korean authorities.

Mr. Bessho (Japan): Japan welcomes the unanimous adoption of resolution 2371 (2017). We would like to express our appreciation to the United States for taking the lead on it. We would also like to thank all other members of the Council for their support and hard work to make today's adoption possible.

The need for the Security Council to strongly condemn North Korea's nuclear tests and ballistic-missile launches has considerably grown in the past year and a half. Since January 2016, North Korea has conducted two nuclear tests and launched approximately 40 ballistic missiles. The sheer number and frequency show how unprecedented and unacceptable these provocations are.

Not only is the quantity outrageous, the qualitative advancements are also deeply alarming. Just last month, we saw two ballistic-missile launches with intercontinental range. The second launch was already more technologically advanced than the first. The

footage broadcast on Japanese television of the most recent launch showed that it was visible with the naked eye in Hokkaido as it fell into the sea off the coast of Japan. If the launch had been less lofted, the missile's range could have covered half the globe. It is abundantly clear that this is an imminent global threat to all Member States, not merely a regional one.

North Korea seems determined to continue its nuclear build-up. In March 2016, the Security Council responded to its fourth nuclear test by adopting resolution 2270 (2016), at the time the most comprehensive to date, sending a clear message to North Korea that it must halt its nuclear development. After a fifth test occurred, in September 2016, the Security Council sent an even stronger message via resolution 2321 (2016). Nevertheless, North Korea has continued to ignore the international community's calls by obstinately forging ahead with its nuclear and missile development programmes. That has resulted in the Council's adoption of resolution 2371 (2017) today. The resolution is robust and will reduce the North Korean regime's revenues by approximately $1 billion. It represents an urgent call to North Korea to change its behaviour.

At this point, it is clear to everyone that North Korea is nowhere near resuming a meaningful dialogue. If we are to change its behaviour, we have no choice but to continue to increase the pressure. All Members of the United Nations must demonstrate a renewed commitment to implementing the existing Security Council resolutions, including the one we have just adopted, rigorously and thoroughly. Japan will continue to work closely with Council members and all Member States in order to reach a comprehensive solution to the problems related to North Korea.

Mr. Llorentty Soliz (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (*spoke in Spanish*): Bolivia reiterates its firm condemnation of the conduct of nuclear tests and the launching of ballistic missiles by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and we urge it to abandon its nuclear and ballistic-missile programme fully, verifiably and irreversibly.

Bolivia voted in favour of resolution 2371 (2017) today based on its peaceful ideals. We do not believe in war as a way of solving the global problems facing the international community. However, we would also like to make it clear that for the Plurinational State of Bolivia, sanctions should not be an end in themselves. In the situation under discussion, they should help the parties involved to come to the table for dialogue. We also believe that the sanctions we have adopted today should have the smallest possible impact on the civilian population and should not affect the humanitarian situation in North Korea.

We urge all the parties involved to avoid escalating rhetoric or action that could increase tensions and put international peace and security in jeopardy on the Korean peninsula. We welcome and reiterate our support for China's dual-action initiative designed to enable a simultaneous halt to both the ballistic-missile launches and nuclear tests and to the military exercises on the Korean peninsula. We also welcome the fact that today's unanimous resolution supports that and also requests that the Six-Party talks be resumed. We urge all the parties involved to abandon any kind of military solution and to resume dialogue with a view to reaching a peaceful diplomatic and political solution.

In our capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), we would like to point out that the provisions of resolution 1540 (2004) are aimed at establishing a platform of assistance and cooperation among States in order to prevent non-State actors from having access to weapons of mass destruction. We are completely against using it as a way of coercing or directing sanctions against States Members of the United Nations. Lastly, we categorically reject the imposition of unilateral sanctions, which constitute a flagrant violation of international law as illegal measures that extend one State's internal jurisdiction over another, in violation of the principle of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States.

The President (*spoke in Arabic*): I shall now make a statement in my national capacity as Permanent Representative of Egypt.

Egypt joined the international consensus and voted in favour of the Security Council's adoption today of resolution 2371 (2017), based on our consistent commitment to upholding the credibility of the nuclear non-proliferation system and of the Council and our firm belief in the importance of ensuring that the Security Council and all United Nations bodies and international stakeholders can deliver on their mandates and their responsibilities in this regard, as Egypt is doing. We also believe that all similar threats should be treated with the same level of seriousness as threats in the field

of the nuclear proliferation, and that every effort should be made to achieve the universality of the the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, without double standards.

Egypt is aware of the threat that North Korea's repeated violations of Security Council resolutions poses to international and regional peace and security. In that regard, we reiterate our desire to see all the parties concerned commit to working to reach a peaceful settlement to the crisis on the Korean peninsula, exercising restraint, taking steps on both sides to de-escalate the situation and paving the way to a return to the negotiating table, with a view to upholding the interests of all concerned and protecting international peace and security. Once again, Egypt welcomes every initiative and constructive idea that uses negotiation and dialogue to achieve the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and, ultimately, either lasting peace or reunification of the two Koreas.

I now resume my functions as President of the Security Council.

I give the floor to the representative of the Republic of Korea.

Mr. Cho Tae-yul (Republic of Korea): I would first like to thank you, Mr. President, for convening today's important meeting and inviting my delegation to participate in it.

Once again, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has turned a deaf ear to the stern warnings of the international community and has responded with even more serious provocations. Along with its nuclear programme, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's missile provocations on 4 and 28 July pose a very serious threat to international peace and security that requires concerted action at the global level. Such reckless acts of defiance to repeated calls from the international community must be met with strengthened measures that can ensure that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will have to bear the consequences of its flagrant violations of international norms and obligations. That is why the Republic of Korea welcomes and fully supports the Council's unanimous adoption today of resolution 2371 (2017). I would like to take this opportunity to thank the United States for its leadership and commitment, as well as all the other members of the Council, including China, for their spirit of cooperation.

Resolution 2371 (2017) introduces robust measures for a sectoral ban that will significantly block the flow into the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of hard currency that might otherwise be diverted to its illicit programme of weapons of mass destruction. We believe that these measures will help significantly to curb the ability of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to further develop its weapons of mass destruction-related activities. By unanimously adopting this resolution today, the Security Council has once again demonstrated that the international community will remain strongly united in its commitment to stop the reckless and destabilizing behaviour of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

In order to pressure the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to change its course, full and thorough implementation of the Security Council's multiple sanctions resolutions is of the utmost importance. The Republic of Korea will remain committed to supporting other Member States in their ongoing efforts to fully and effectively implement these resolutions, including resolution 2371 (2017), adopted today.

Pyongyang still seems to be operating under the delusion that its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes can ensure its security. On the contrary, its obsessive pursuit of such programmes will only serve to strengthen the already firm resolve of the international community. No matter how far the Democratic People's Republic of Korea moves in pursuit of its nuclear ambitions, our resolve to stop this will never diminish. Pyongyang should therefore refrain from further testing our robust collective resolve, and I sincerely hope that, by choosing the path towards denuclearization, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will eventually stand on the right side of history.

The President (*spoke in Arabic*): There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers.

The meeting rose at 4.10 p.m.

United Nations S/PV.8020

Security Council

Seventy-second year

Provisional

8020th meeting
Wednesday, 9 August 2017, 10 a.m.
New York

President:	Mr. Aboulatta	(Egypt)
Members:	Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	Mr. Llorentty Soliz
	China	Mr. Shen Bo
	Ethiopia	Mr. Alemu
	France	Mrs. Gueguen
	Italy	Mr. Lambertini
	Japan	Mr. Kawamura
	Kazakhstan	Mr. Sadykov
	Russian Federation	Mr. Nebenzia
	Senegal	Mr. Seck
	Sweden	Mr. Skau
	Ukraine	Mr. Vitrenko
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Mr. Rycroft
	United States of America	Ms. Sison
	Uruguay	Mr. Bermúdez

Agenda

Maintenance of international peace and security

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The meeting was called to order at 10 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Maintenance of international peace and security

The President (*spoke in Arabic*): The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.

The Council has before it the text of a statement by the President on behalf of the Council on the subject of today's meeting. I thank Council members for their valuable contributions to the statement.

In accordance with the understanding reached among the members of the Council, I shall take it that the members of the Security Council agree to the statement, which will be issued as a document of the Security Council under the symbol S/PRST/2017/14.

The meeting rose at 10.05 a.m.

United Nations S/PV.8021

Security Council

Seventy-second year

Provisional

8021st meeting
Wednesday, 9 August 2017, 10.05 a.m.
New York

President:	Mr. Aboulatta	(Egypt)
Members:	Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	Mr. Llorentty Soliz
	China	Mr. Shen Bo
	Ethiopia	Mr. Alemu
	France	Mrs. Gueguen
	Italy	Mr. Lambertini
	Japan	Mr. Kawamura
	Kazakhstan	Mr. Sadykov
	Russian Federation	Mr. Nebenzia
	Senegal	Mr. Seck
	Sweden	Mr. Skau
	Ukraine	Mr. Vitrenko
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Mr. Rycroft
	United States of America	Ms. Sison
	Uruguay	Mr. Bermúdez

Agenda

Consideration of the draft report of the Security Council to the General Assembly

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17-25035 (E)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Consideration of the draft report of the Security Council to the General Assembly

The President (*spoke in Arabic*): The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.

The Security Council will now proceed to the consideration of its annual report to the General Assembly, for the period from 1 August 2015 to 31 December 2016.

The draft report has been provided to the members of the Council. The introduction to the draft report was prepared by the delegation of Japan, as President of the Council in July 2016, with the participation of the other members of the Council. The body of the report was prepared by the Secretariat. I should like to express my appreciation to Japan and to the Secretariat for their respective contributions.

I should like to point out that the draft report was prepared in accordance with the notes by the President of 26 July 2010 (S/2010/507) and of 10 December 2015 (S/2015/944).

I now give the floor to the representative of Japan, whose delegation was responsible for drafting the introduction to this year's annual report.

Mr. Kawamura (Japan): We are delighted to present the draft annual report of the Security Council to the General Assembly. I would like to express my appreciation to each and every Member State concerned for their spirit of cooperation and flexibility during the process of preparing the report.

My appreciation also goes to the Secretariat, especially the Security Council Affairs Division, for their deep institutional knowledge and precious advice as we worked on the draft.

As the President of the Security Council for the month of July 2016, Japan was responsible for coordinating the preparation of the introduction of the draft report. Implementing the note by the President of the Security Council of 10 December 2015 (S/2015/944), the draft report before the Council covers the period from 1 August 2015 to 31 December 2016. The 17-month coverage period is a transitional arrangement and, as stipulated in the presidential note, the period of coverage for all future reports shall be from 1 January to 31 December.

The report includes key activities, meetings and decisions taken by the Security Council to maintain international peace and security during the reporting period on the items of which the Council is seized.

In summarizing a wide array of Council activity over the period of 17 months, we intended to be as objective as possible, while making utmost efforts to describe the context in which the Council's actions were taken, in order to enhance the transparency and accountability of the work of the Council.

The draft report is the product of a rigorous coordination process. The report is a Council document and, in accordance with the note S/2015/944, the introduction should be approved by all members of the Council that served on the Council during the period covered by the report.

Japan considers that the annual report forms an important part of the work of the Security Council, as required by Article 24 of the Charter of the United Nations, and hopes that this volume will be a useful reference for Council members, the wider membership, the Secretariat and all who serve the maintenance of international peace and security.

The President (*spoke in Arabic*): It is my understanding that the Council is ready to proceed to the adoption of the draft annual report.

May I take it that the draft report is adopted by the Council?

There being no objection, it is so decided.

This decision will be reflected in a note by the President of the Security Council to be issued as document S/2017/691.

The meeting rose at 10.10 a.m.